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Abstract 
An evolving European executive order is changing the circumstances for national steering and 
administrative capacities. Increasingly compound and interconnected administrative structures 
that span across levels of governance provide an environment where domestic agencies might 
be serving multiple organizations or centres of authority simultaneously. Thus potentially 
challenging national control and accountability. 
This thesis has set out to map NVE’s potential participation in such multilevel administrative 
structures for energy regulation in Europe. By examining NVE’s connection and contact with 
its ministry department, the supranational organizations of the energy sector, and its 
participation in transnational energy networks. Theoretically, the thesis is based on two 
mutually complementing theoretical perspectives, multilevel administration and organization 
theory. Whilst MLA might explain how and to what extent NVE participates in a multilevel 
model of European energy regulation, certain organizational characteristics might explain 
why connections occurs and what might cause inherent variations. Another goal is to consider 
what consequences potential findings might entail. The methodology is based on qualitative 
interviews, supplemented with document analysis. 
Findings show that NVE is in active contact with especially its ministry department and its 
sister regulators in the Nordic and European countries. Contact with the latter takes place 
mainly through the transnational networks NordREG and CEER. Direct contact with the 
supranational organizations appears limited, mainly due to organizational circumstances. 
Some indirect contact might however be present, then through the transnational networks or 
the EU energy agency. Thus, the thesis adds to the existing literature that there to varying 
degrees exists close and direct links between Norwegian domestic agencies and the other 
organizations, often through sector-specific, transnational networks. Rather than being subject 
to compound steering from organizations across multiple levels of governance, it however 
seems as NVE actively works in connection with multiple actors for the purpose of 
harmonizing and streamlining the European power and energy market. Thus not necessarily 
serving several centres of authority at exceeding levels of governance, but rather being an 
active component in a compound, multilevel administrative model. Ultimately, when working 
on European energy regulation, NVE appears as a specialized, professional and relatively 
autonomous agency.  
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Preface 
The energy sector is currently subject to rapid and massive changes, and facing uncertainties 
about the future. Some even deem the changes to be ground breaking, or talk about how they 
will turn everything upside down. As I am writing this, an annual energy conference is taking 
place in Kristiansand, where the overarching topic is how the entire sector cannot keep 
walking down the old familiar path. 
A fundamental change is the growing interconnectedness across levels, and the increasing 
globalization of the sector. When cross-border, cross-level European cooperation becomes the 
new normal for those who provide national energy regulation, changed circumstances 
becomes reality for the domestic companies that base their work on these regulations. One of 
these companies is Agder Energi (AE), based in Kristiansand. The choice of NVE as a case 
study object is loosely based on a request from AE, and a wish for increased knowledge on 
how administrative changes in the European energy sector changes their circumstances. 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Jarle Trondal, for pointing me in the right direction 
whenever needed. Also, gratitude goes to my contacts in NVE for insightful information. 
Lastly, to those I have shared coffee breaks, triumphs and frustrations with the past years, and 
to those who made time for proofreading. Thank you. 
 
Kristiansand, May 2016, Nore Sklett. 
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1. Introduction 
Norway is connected to the European Union (EU) through a complex and comprehensive web 
of agreements and cooperation within most policy sectors. Mainly, this relationship is 
founded on the EEA Agreement1, which came into force in 1994 (Eriksen & Fossum, 2014; 
NOU 2012:2, 2012). The EEA agreement was meant to function as a bridge between the 
members of the EU, and the adjoining third countries that chose to formally stay on the 
outside. The agreement was also meant to serve as a mechanism to expand the EU’s internal 
market, and secure uniformity throughout Europe2. The countries that have signed the EEA 
Agreement have simultaneously have agreed upon the principle of homogeneity, which states 
that all EEA legislation must be in line with the EU internal market legislation (Norway 
Mission to the EU, 2015). Thus, uniformity in Europe can be easily achieved, since also 
countries formally placed on the outside both in terms of borders and arenas of decision-
making, needs to incorporate EU regulations relatively unopposed. In 2011, roughly 170 out 
of 600 Norwegian laws where more or less based on EU legislation, and the same is true for 
more than a thousand Norwegian regulations (NOU 2012:2, 2012). 
One policy area that is incorporated into the EEA Agreement, and which is particularly 
interesting for Norway and Norwegian EU-politics, is the energy sector. The EU’s internal 
energy market involves common European regulation of energy resources and power 
operations, in line with the ideas of uniformity mentioned above. At the same time, energy 
has always had an exceptional position in Norway, and Norwegian energy policy has a long 
tradition of strong public management (Austvik & Claes, 2011). Nonetheless, through the 
EEA agreement, Norway has incorporated a wide range of energy-related directives and 
regulations connected to the internal energy market (Olje- og energidepartementet, s.a.). 
Similarly to many of the other policy areas in the EEA agreement, Norway is obliged to take 
in most EU energy regulations without having a formal place in the arenas of decision-
making. Consequently, this might challenge the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate’s (NVE) 3  position, as Norway's energy regulator with the power and 
                                                
1 The Agreement on the European Economic Area, Norwegian Den Europeiske Økonomiske 
Samarbeidsavtale (EØS-avtalen) (EFTA, s.a.). 
2 Underlining that in this context, “Europe” will refer to not only of the EU and its members, 
but also European third countries that in various degrees might be connected to the EU.  
3 Norwegian, Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat 
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responsibility to manage Norway's water and energy resources (Norwegian Water Resources 
and Energy Directorate, 2011). Subsequently, traditions of strong national steering in the 
energy sector might also be subject to change. 
In order to fully grasp the relationship between Norway and the EU, and NVE's role in 
European energy regulation, an overview of the formal affiliations of the sector is not 
sufficient to understand the inherent complexities. Experiences from the energy sector may 
particularly indicate that an active and insightful relationship with the EU is perhaps more 
important than the overall formal affiliation between Norway and the EU (Austvik & Claes, 
2011). It is equally essential to understand the meaning of actual participation and various 
types of network cooperation, which changes traditional administrative structures and has 
become increasingly relevant within the "European administrative space" (EAS) (Trondal & 
Peters, 2013). 
There already exists extensive literature on how "Europeanization"4 occurs, and what impact 
the EU system has on its member states and adjoining third countries (Börzel & Risse, 2007; 
Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2015; Olsen, 2002). A more recent generation of European 
integration research, often referred to as multilevel administration (MLA) goes in depth into 
how changes that have occurred at several administrative levels in Europe creates an 
environment where the EU, mainly through the European Commission5, connects to units or 
organizations at lower level of governance. Thus resulting in national agencies that appear to 
operate with two or more "hats" (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). This means that 
national agencies’, such as NVE, might be parts of the national administration while they 
simultaneously work in close connection with administrative units at the supranational level. 
In addition, national agencies might also actively participate in transnational networks. Such 
compound connections with multiple collaborators form the basis for changing governance 
structures in Europe, which further might result in compound multilevel administrative 
models (Egeberg, 2006; Trondal, 2015a). 
                                                
4 Europeanization might be defined as ’a set of processes of construction, diffusion and 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ”ways 
of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies’ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30). 
5 Hereby ”the Commission” 
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Compound multilevel steering in Europe might have several consequences. One possible 
implication is how strong coordination across levels in Europe through various networks and 
partnership structures might be on collision course with traditions of strong coordination at 
the national level (Egeberg & Trondal, 2015). The EU has recently undergone a number of 
changes to strengthen their coordinating capacity, by building an increasingly comprehensive 
system of executive power. Within the energy sector these changes involve the strengthening 
of the EU organizations in the sector, in addition to ensuring consistent and uniform use of 
EU energy regulation among member states and adjoining third countries (Jevnaker, 2015). 
These changes might make the EU, through the Commission and the Directorate-General for 
Energy (DG Energy), along with the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER), able to bypass national executive centres and connect with administrative units 
located at the national level, such as NVE. This creates a dilemma, where tighter EU 
coordination cannot exist parallel to traditional, national control of regulatory authority in the 
energy sector (Austvik & Claes, 2011; Egeberg & Trondal, 2015). 
1.1 Research Questions 
This project is a case study of NVE and this agency’s authority as regulator of Norwegian 
power and energy resources. Particular attention is devoted to NVE’s underlying supervisory 
of Energy Market Regulation (EMR)6. The EMR maintains NVE's national regulatory 
authority within the electricity and gas market, and actively take part in European and Nordic 
energy regulatory networks in order to do so (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2013, 
s.a.-a). This project thus sets fore at examining how and to what extent NVE, through the 
EMR, form part of a European multilevel model with multiple regulatory collaborators. With 
focus on examining how connections between NVE and the other organizations actually are, 
why they might occur or be subject to variations, in addition to the potential consequences of 
such the various connections. 
The following research questions are advanced: 
How and to what extent does NVE participate in a compound model of multilevel European 
energy regulation? Second, what might explain such participation? Last, what consequences 
could participation potentially entail? 
                                                
6 Norwegian, Elmarkedstilsynet. 
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These questions provide the foundation for researching NVE’s connections with relevant 
collaborators in the field of European energy regulation. However, as the global world 
consists of a range of actors, and since the energy sector appears as a policy sector that to a 
large extent is characterized by a range of international cooperation (Norges vassdrags- og 
energidirektorat, 2009; Olje- og energidepartementet, s.a.), we might expect a national agency 
as NVE to have many collaborators. Therefore, in order to use NVE’s connections as a 
beneficial case study, the project is limited to deal with the organizations that appear the most 
relevant in this particular context. This limitation is based on which organizations NVE 
describes as its key collaborators, in addition to organizations deemed relevant on the basis of 
MLA as a theoretical perspective. 
MLA as a theoretical framework, described in detail in Chapter 2.1, provides an assumption 
of how national agencies might work for multiple “masters” simultaneously, consequently 
being “multi-hatted”. Previous research has shown that these agencies are key parts of the 
national administration, while at the same time working in close cooperation with the 
Commission, or the Commission’s departments (Egeberg, 2006). In this context, it is 
therefore interesting to examine the connection NVE has to the national Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (OED)7, and to the Commission and DG Energy. Previous research has 
also shown that national agencies are not only connected to their national departments, or to 
the Commission, but that they also appear to work in close connection to relevant EU 
agencies and “sister-agencies” in other countries, often through transnational networks 
(Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, 2015). Based on information from NVE this involves the EU 
agency ACER, in addition to the Nordic energy regulator network NordREG8, and the 
corresponding European network CEER9. The overarching goal of the latter two regulatory 
networks is specified as a wish to achieve greater harmonization of legislation and regulatory 
framework so as to facilitate deeper integration in the Nordic countries and in Europe in 
general (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2009). 
Following, the research questions form the basis for examining NVE’s vertical connections to 
the Commission and DG Energy, to ACER, and to the OED, and the horizontal connections 
to NordREG and CEER. A key element is that of investigating how intertwined these 
networks and connections might be, and whether there exists a centralization of the energy 
                                                
7 Norwegian, Olje- og energidepartmentet (OED). 
8 Forum of Nordic Energy Regulators (NordREG). 
9 Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER). 
  
5 
regulating authority around the institutions at the EU level. If that is the case we might claim 
to see the creation of a European energy regulating multilevel administration (Trondal, 2010). 
This project aims at three goals. First, by using NVE as a case, the purpose is to examine 
NVE’s connections with various collaborators that are vertically and horizontally placed 
across level of governance and national borders. This is examined by mapping both up- and 
downstream processes of NVE's work with EU energy regulation. The second purpose is to 
explain the underlying behaviour behind such networking and multilevel connections. For that 
purpose, explanatory variables from organizational theory are included, which are deemed 
appropriate tools when it comes to examining a possible European multilevel administration 
(Trondal, 2010). These regard some of the fundamental conditions behind MLA, such as 
vertical specialization and supranational capacity (Egeberg, 2006). In addition, horizontal 
specialization, organizational duplication and degree of politicization are included as relevant 
variables, based on assumptions from previous research (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 
2011). These variables are explained in detail in chapter 2.2. Third, and as argued by Bach, 
De Francesco, Maggetti and Ruffing (2016), focus should be on not only the benefits of 
playing at a multilevel arena, but also on the constraints deriving from it. Following, the 
project lastly aims at elucidating some of the consequences NVE’s connections across levels 
of governance might entail. 
1.1.1 Main Findings 
NVE is in active contact with its ministry, through both formal steering mechanisms, active 
information exchange, and for the purpose of providing technical advice. Most contact 
appears to follow the organizationally expected based on vertical specialization, in that 
contact takes place mainly through the leadership of NVE and that lower level sections and 
employees perceive to enjoy significant autonomy in their daily work. Internationally, NVE’s 
most important collaborators appears to be their sister regulators in especially the other 
Nordic countries. This contact takes place mainly through NordREG. Contact with the 
remaining European energy regulators also seems relevant, through the CEER. This 
horizontal network participation might largely be explained by the horizontally organized 
structure of the energy sector, and the degree of technicality of the energy regulation. Contact 
with ACER seems to be limited due to organizational circumstances, mainly the stagnated 
inclusion of the third energy package into the EEA framework. Until implementation of the 
third package, NVE is denied access to the forum for decision-making in ACER. Direct 
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contact with the other supranational organizations is reported as minimal, despite the 
organizationally expected. Some indirect contact is however plausible, then through the 
transnational networks or through ACER. 
1.1.2 Concepts 
In order to create a beneficial backdrop for the following theoretical presentation and 
discussion, some concepts that will frequently be used throughout the text is elaborated. 
Autonomy: In this context, autonomy regards the degree to which national agencies, such as 
NVE, are able to act and make decisions relatively independent from any kind of ministerial 
steering. The concept is often perceived as twofold and divided into de jure and de facto 
autonomy. An agency’s de jure autonomy regards the formal independence it is granted, for 
instance by deliberate design or allocation from the parent ministry. De facto autonomy 
however, concerns the actual independence an agency enjoys, particularly regarding the 
phases of policy processes (Bach & Ruffing, 2013; Ruffing, 2015).   
Energy Regulation: NVE is the formal regulator of all Norwegian energy and power 
operations. This entails, as previously mentioned, that NVE is responsible for managing 
Norway's water and energy resources (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2011). In this 
context, the focus is mainly on NVE's authority in relation to the regulation of energy. This 
authority is manifested through the Energy Act 10, which makes it both the task and 
responsibility of NVE to make decisions accordingly (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2002). 
More specifically, NVE sets the framework, through the approval and allocation of licenses, 
for the production, conversion, transmission, trading, distribution and use of energy resources 
in Norway (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2015a). 
European multilevel administration: As a level might be defined as ‘the existence of separate 
and relatively independent sets of institutions, personnel, rules, finances, and so on’ (Bauer & 
Trondal, 2015a, p. 17), a multilevel characteristic is deemed to exist in mainly all political 
systems. Interestingly, it also means that the EU, with its institutions, becomes a supranational 
level on top of the already existing levels of governance. As a separate supranational level, 
the EU is situated outside the national institutional context, and ‘does not integrate well into 
existing national systems of executive government and parliamentary accountability’ (Bauer 
                                                
10 Lov om produksjon, omforming, overføring, omsetning, fordeling og bruk av energy m.m. 
(Energiloven, 1990). 
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& Trondal, 2015a, p. 17). Thereby, the multilevel characteristic of the administrative system 
consist of a paradoxical mix of how supranational institutions are able to act relatively 
independent from the member state governments and at the same time being institutional 
interconnected with institutions across levels of government. The term encompasses the 
development of a new administrative order in Europe, and is often used in order to understand 
how connections might cut across administrative levels, and how institutions might be 
concurrently independent and interdependent (Bauer & Trondal, 2015a; Trondal, 2015a). The 
theoretical framework of multilevel administration is presented in detail in chapter 2.1.  
Up- and downstream processes: In this context we talk about these phases in terms of how 
NVE relates to its European collaborators, when it comes to working with EU regulation of 
energy resources. Upstream processes regards the extent to which NVE participate in the 
formulation of energy policy. Often where decisions are taken at the supranational level, but 
where these decisions might affect NVE’s work or its authority as the regulator of Norwegian 
energy resources. Such participation might take the form of both formal or informal contact 
between NVE and the supranational organizations. Downstream processes concern how NVE 
works with implementing and practising EU regulations, and to what extent contact with other 
actors occur in this work. Previous research has shown that national agencies who implements 
EU legislation is subject to interference from the national ministry, the Commission, “sister 
agencies” in other countries, and EU agencies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011b). In this context, 
this concerns the OED, the Commission, NordREG, CEER and ACER. 
1.2 Previous Research 
European integration research has throughout times aimed at examining the connections 
between the various actors operating within the EU’s framework. While the debate in 
traditional integration theory discussed whether power was situated at the national level or at 
EU institutions11, later research of multilevel governance (MLG) opened up for how other 
actors and levels also stand out as relevant, and that these must be included in the research if 
we are to understand the full complexities of the EU (see i.e. Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). 
Subsequently, MLA has gone further, aiming at unpacking these levels and actors in detail 
with the intention of highlighting analytical dimensions that the MLG literature have been 
                                                
11  The “Grand Debate” between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (see i.e. 
Hoffmann, 1966; Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 1998). 
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criticized of overlooking (Trondal, 2015a). These dimensions regard how the focus of 
research should be directed towards sub-units at various administrative levels, that the units of 
analysis cannot be considered as unitary actors when they can be subject to differentiation, 
and lastly that organizational variables can contribute to increased understanding of the 
interaction between these actors or units (Trondal, 2015a). 
There already exist a number of studies that has aimed at examining the emergence of a 
MLA, particularly for the purpose of identifying and understanding the building of EU's 
administrative capacity (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2011a; Rittberger & Wonka, 
2011), and how there in the "European space" has developed connections that pictures an 
interconnected European public administration (Bauer & Trondal, 2015b; Curtin & Egeberg, 
2008; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 2010). In addition, there also exist a large number 
of case studies that focus on administrative sub-units at different levels, and to what extent 
they participate in models of MLA. In a Norwegian context these studies have attempted to 
identify the connections Norwegian agencies might have to the Commission’s administration, 
to EU level agencies, or to "sister agencies" in other countries. Currently, the following areas 
have been examined: Postal services and telecommunications (Myhre, 2005), competition 
(Danielsen, 2012; Solstad, 2009; Stenby, 2009; Støle, 2006), food safety (Ugland & 
Veggeland, 2006), environment (Martens, 2006, 2008a, 2008b), chemicals (Gudbrandson, 
2011), statistics (Sverdrup, 2006; Teigen, 2014), pharmaceuticals (Vestlund, 2009), railways 
(Stene, 2010), shipping (Gulbrandsen, 2011), aviation (Johannessen, 2012), health (Søetorp, 
2012), data storage and privacy (Løkken, 2011), finance (Isaksen, 2012), and defence (Aabel, 
2013). These studies confirm that there to varying degrees exists close and direct links 
between the domestic agencies and the other actors, often through sector-specific, 
transnational networks (Egeberg & Trondal, 2014). 
There are also a handful of studies that examine the existence of a MLA in the energy sector. 
Torbjørg Jevnaker (2015) has for instance examined how the EU over time has increased its 
administrative and executive capacity in the energy sector. She claims that we see the 
emergence of an energy specific multilevel administration, and concludes by asking questions 
as to how this strengthening of the supranational level may influence the member states 
(Jevnaker, 2015). Potential impacts would then also be applicable to adjoining third countries, 
such as Norway. In addition, Eva Ruffing (2015) has examined the consequences of 
Europeanization of the German energy regulator, which became part of ACER after the 
agency establishment. Her study discovers that the German energy regulator gained 
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significant de facto autonomy from its ministry through the involvement in European network 
structures. The German energy ministry has largely kept its steering position, however the 
new connections has granted the agency ‘new roles and channels of influence, making the old 
steering routines insufficient and granting agencies more de facto autonomy’ (Ruffing, 2015, 
p. 1123). In that particular case, the autonomy is particularly evident in the formulation phase 
of policy-making. 
There also exists a range of historical accounts of EU energy regulation12, and NVE itself has 
issued publications on Norwegian energy regulator and power market history13. Nevertheless, 
there are not to my knowledge any studies that go in depth into Norwegian participation in 
MLA within the energy sector. Complementary reasons for selecting NVE as the case study 
object will be elaborated after a brief portrayal of the theoretical framework. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
This project follows in line with the most recent research conducted on MLA and the 
theoretical framework of the project is therefore based on two different, yet mutually 
complementing perspectives: MLA and organizational theory. One basic assumption of MLA 
is how national agencies, such as NVE, under certain conditions bypasses their national 
ministries and rather connects to multiple other organizations more or less simultaneously. 
The theoretical research framework of MLA is presented in chapter 2.1, and provides a 
foundation for examining to what extent NVE takes part in compound European 
administrative structures. Investigating NVE’s connection to the OED, to the Commission’s 
administration, and to ACER, CEER and NordREG. 
While MLA might help us understand how such connections span out, elements of 
organization theory might illuminate why it occurs, or what might cause inherent variations 
in degrees of contact. The assumption is that certain organizational characteristics provide 
implications for how national agencies connect to different organizations. Therefore, 
beneficial for this particular project, five organizational characteristics are used as 
independent variables. The first two regard how the occurrence of MLA is especially subject 
to two conditions. First of all, MLA is conditioned upon the degree of autonomy of the 
national agency. In this case this refers to whether NVE is vertically specialized, and thus 
                                                
12 See i.e. Mathieu (forthcoming). 
13 See i.e. Faugli (2012). 
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subject to de facto autonomy from OED. Secondly, the institutions at the supranational level 
are in need of significant capacity in order for national agencies’ to connect to them. The 
chances for MLA to be present are thus dependent upon a certain extent of supranational 
capacity. In addition, three other variables that are theoretically assumed to influence the 
potential connections are included. These regard the degree to which the OED might seek to 
strengthen their steering of NVE by duplicating its tasks and responsibilities. Also, how the 
sectorial nature of NVE is expected to provide foundations for its connections to similar 
institutions across borders. Lastly, degree of politicization of the European energy regulations 
is expected to affect the degree to which OED seeks control over NVE. The independent 
variables are explained in depth in chapter 2.2. 
1.4 Case Selection 
The choice of case is largely twofold. First of all, major changes are today taking place in the 
energy sector in Europe. Because of this, the sector has been subject to increased research 
interest recently. Especially in relation to the EU, energy policy stands out as highly relevant. 
Mainly because of the constantly evolving energy and climate goals, as well as on-going 
plans for the creation of an energy union and an increasing desire for strong coordination in 
the energy sector for the EU, its member states and the EU’s partners (European Commission 
Energy, s.a.-a; European Union, s.a.). 
Second, and as previously mentioned, a study of NVE’s participation in MLA might fill a gap 
in the existing literature. A survey of NVE's participation in a European multilevel 
administration on energy regulation would join the ranks of already conducted case studies, 
and expand the current knowledge to also encompass the energy sector. Thus contributing to 
increasing the existing level of knowledge of the changes that are happening for the 
administrative structures in Europe. As such, we might also increase the knowledge regarding 
how Norway can and perhaps also should act in relation to this. 
1.5 Methodology 
As this project is a case study of NVE and this agency’s participation in energy regulatory 
MLA, the chosen research design and method should present an opportunity for collecting 
empirics that creates a foundation for analysing whether and how such connections take place, 
in addition to why they might occur. 
  
11 
In order to get hold of information on how NVE connects to the chosen group of 
collaborators, a range of in-depth interviews are conducted with employees of the EMR of 
NVE. Triangulation is made use of, as the information gathered from the interviews is united 
with information gathered from a certain extent of document analysis. By including 
information from public documents, the respondent’s percept of connections between NVE 
and the collaborators are examined in relation to the formal associations between the 
institutions for the purpose of more comprehensive empirics. 
1.6 Disposition 
The remaining sections proceed as follows. The next chapter presents the theoretical 
framework from which the research is based, with a twofold theoretical account. First of all, 
an account of MLA as a theoretical framework is presented, culminating in a research model. 
Second, elements of organizational theory are presented, which will function as independent 
variables in this project. These variables helps shed light on why connections between NVE 
and the other organizational might occur, in addition to what might create variations of these 
connections. Both parts conclude with tables of expected findings, if the assumptions are 
validated by the collected results. Following, the chosen research design and methodology is 
presented in the third chapter. Chapter three concludes with a discussion of the qualities and 
challenges that the research design and methodology might entail. Chapter four presents the 
collected results, focusing on how energy regulation is organized at the national level, at the 
EU level, and transnationally, with NVE as the focus point. Special focus is granted to NVE’s 
role in the down- and upstream process of European energy regulation. In chapter five, the 
collected results are discussed in relation to the theoretical assumptions from the second 
chapter. The expected findings resurface, and focus is how debating whether the findings 
demonstrate that we have found what we were expecting, and to what extent. Potential 
consequences of the results are also elucidated in this chapter. The project is concluded in 
chapter six, which also includes some pointers on where to go from here.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this project is to examine to what extent NVE participates in a European 
multilevel energy regulation, and what might cause variations of such participation. In order 
to do so, the theoretical framework is based on two different, yet mutually complementing, 
theoretical perspectives. Combined, the two perspectives will be made use of in order to shed 
light on the collected empirics. 
First, previous research on multilevel MLA provides a framework for mapping NVE’s 
participation in compound European administrative structures. One basic assumption within 
the MLA perspective is how domestic agencies, such as NVE, under certain conditions tend 
to by-pass their national departments and create new ties of cooperation with a multitude of 
other actors in the “European administrative space” (EAS) (Trondal & Peters, 2013). Findings 
from previous research indicate that we can expect NVE’s participation in compound 
European MLA, where NVE has connections with different collaborators simultaneously 
(Egeberg & Trondal, 2009).  
Second, in order to shed light on why connections between domestic agencies and different 
collaborators occur, in addition to examining what might cause potential variations, 
explanatory variables based on organizational theory are included. It has often been claimed 
that political processes and systems cannot be adequately understood without considering the 
organizational dimension of executive orders (Olsen, 2007; Trondal, 2010). Therefore, 
organizational elements have often been used in recent studies on the connections between the 
EU, the member states and adjoining third countries. In this context, organizational theory can 
help us understand why compound, multilevel connections between the included actors might 
occur. The chosen variables are based on assumptions that certain organizational 
characteristics will set guidelines for how domestic agencies connect with various 
collaborators. In this context they are treated as independent variables. The variables concern 
the vertical and horizontal specialization of the case object, the capacity and competences of 
the supranational level, the degree of politicization of the policy area, and whether or not 
organizational duplication is present. 
This chapter is organized as follows: The theoretical perspective of MLA is presented in 
detail in the following chapter 2.1. This presentation of MLA firstly concerns how previous 
research creates a beneficial backdrop and useful analytical framework for the research that 
will be conducted in this project. Second, the case-specific research model is presented, 
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providing a descriptive picture of NVEs connections with the different collaborators in the 
EAS. This model emerges as a compound model of multilevel administration. Following, a 
thorough and case relevant presentation of the organizational variables follows in chapter 2.2, 
where the five independent variables are presented in detail. Both the compound model of 
MLA and the organizational variables will be subject to the deduction of a series of expected 
findings, which will be presented in summarizing tables following each sub-chapter. 
2.1 Multilevel Administration 
The research field of European studies and European integration has continuously been 
subject to development, parallel to the development of the research objective. One common 
denominator of the diverse theories and perspectives is the goal to enlighten the relations and 
power structures between the institutions and actors that have existed within the field. 
However, as mentioned, the organizational dimensions that characterize executive orders 
should be included in order to adequately understand the political systems or processes 
(Olsen, 2007). More recent research within this field has therefore aimed at explaining the 
executive order of the EU. Therefore, whilst some features of the MLA perspective has roots 
in more traditional integration theory, it also represents the merging of integration theory and 
studies of public administration (Trondal, 2010). 
Previous research has put forward assumptions that we have currently experienced three 
broad generations of study of executive orders in Europe (Trondal, 2010, 2011). The first 
generation takes a somewhat intergovernmental form where domestic executive and 
administrative systems are portrayed as closed-of systems, separated from both international 
politics and organizations (Trondal, 2010). Following the intergovernmental logic, the claim 
is that national governments are perceived as the main executive centre of policy-making. 
Thus, within this generation, ‘domestic agencies are most commonly pictured as integral sub-
units within domestic central administration’ (Trondal, 2011, p. 61), serving one centre of 
authority and thereby being perceived as “single-hatted” agencies. 
The second generation shifted attention, and rather focused on the international organizations 
of the executive Europe. Some of the research within this generation is more commonly 
known as Europeanization (see i.e. Börzel & Risse, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2015) or 
Multilevel Governance (see i.e. Marks et al., 1996; Piattoni, 2010), where focus is on how the 
EU system affects domestic policy, polity and politics. Research within this generation thus 
manifests as a top-down approach to European integration, recognizing domestic units as 
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relevant actors and examining their involvement in EU level politics. However largely 
ignoring under what conditions involvement might occur, in addition to ignoring that such 
participation might be subject to differentiation (Trondal, 2010). 
Lastly, the currently on-going generation of study combines the two former generations, in 
addition to taking the complexity of today’s administrative systems into account. This 
generation of study ‘aims to both identify the component parts of compound executive orders 
and to theorize the conditions under which different components are activated and 
deactivated’ (Trondal, 2010, p. 16). This generation thereby opens up the “black boxes” MLG 
has been criticized of having, and goes in depth into the processes of Europeanization, for the 
purpose of grasping the inherent complexities of current executive processes within EU’s 
framework. As such, this third generation marks a turn for studies on European integration 
and studies on public administration, by partially integrating these two strands of theory 
(Trondal, 2010). Ultimately, this has provided a theoretical framework for understanding the 
European multilevel administration. 
2.1.1 Outlining the Analytical Framework 
The works by Egeberg and his associates kicked of the studies on the connections between 
administrative systems at supranational and national level of governance, and how that 
changes the European executive order (Bach, Ruffing, & Yesilkagit, 2015; Egeberg, 2006). 
This research builds on the existing multilevel structure of MLG, but evolves past MLG by 
examining in depth what each actor, and the relations between them, consists of. One basic 
assumption behind the early research on MLA is how certain developments in Europe provide 
for fundamental changes in the inherent executive orders. This regards ‘the emancipation of a 
strong European executive institution (the Commission) and the domestic fragmentation of 
government systems’ (Bauer & Trondal, 2015a, p. 10) 
First of all, the emancipation of the executive function at the EU level is credited to two 
parallel developments in the EU, the strengthening of the Commission and the increasing 
number of EU level agencies. As EU’s executive power, the Commission is formally 
separated from steering by national governments or by the Council of the European Union14 
and is therefore able to act relatively independently (Egeberg, 2006). These characteristics 
ultimately make the Commission a unique administrative organization, differing from the 
                                                
14 Hereafter “the Council”. 
  
15 
administrative function and the territorial specialization of traditional international 
organizations. In addition, the Commissions executive function has been strengthened through 
the establishment of a range of EU level agencies (Egeberg, 2006), which is more commonly 
referred to as EU level “agencification” (Trondal, 2014). The process of “agencification” 
represents a fragmentation of regulative authority in Europe, and a delegation of 
responsibility from the Commission to professionalized and independent institutions (Levi-
Faur, 2011). As such, executive capacity is being transferred from the member states and into 
new formations at the EU level (Curtin & Egeberg, 2008). This process thus represents a 
move, or proliferation, of executive and regulatory power in the EU, to agencies that are 
formally separated from nation states’ political steering. 
Secondly, the emergence of a European MLA system is conditioned upon a New Public 
Management (NPM) inspired development, where national agencies increasingly have been 
organized at arm’s length from their respective ministries (Egeberg, 2006). This development 
has subsequently enabled the same domestic agencies to be re-coupled by the increasingly 
powerful supranational executive, thereby “by-passing” their respective ministries. As such, 
the strengthening of the EU executive and the national de-coupling of domestic agencies, 
might result in what Egeberg (2006) refers to as “double-hatted” national agencies. Where 
national agencies functions as parts of the national administration while at the same time 
being connected to the supranational level in processes of policymaking. 
The explanation behind the bypassing of national governments and the subsequent “double-
hattedness” of domestic agencies is threefold. Firstly, lacking own agencies at the national 
level, the Commission has interests in being connected to other forms of administrative 
capacity in the member states. Such connections are enabled since these agencies seem to be, 
at least to a certain extent, autonomous from their respective ministries. Secondly, the 
Commission is in need of stable partners, in both the formulation and implementation phases 
of EU legislation (Egeberg, 2006). National governments are formally connected to the 
Council, and implementation through national governments might make the policies highly 
contingent upon national traditions, politics or capabilities (Egeberg, 2015; Knill, 2001). 
Thus, partly decoupled and autonomous national agencies might provide the Commission 
with the adequate stability for uniform handling of EU legislation. Lastly, since the 
Commission has authority as supervisor of EU policy implementation, and this 
implementation is carried out by domestic agencies, some sort of connection between these 
two actors seems natural. However, because of the Commissions relatively independent role, 
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the supervision of EU policy implementation might take a relatively different form than 
traditional supervising and evaluation (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011b). 
In addition to functioning as parts of national administration and parts of the EUs executive 
apparatus, domestic agencies also seem to have close contact with “sister agencies” in other 
countries, most often through transnational networks. An interesting consequence of domestic 
agencies’ cooperation in transnational networks is how they might evolve past being “double-
hatted”, and instead becoming increasingly networked or “multi-hatted” with several 
connections being simultaneously active and important (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). Such 
transnational networks are commonly portrayed as a solution in an increasingly complex 
institutional environment, in which handling of cross-border issues and exchanging “best 
practices” is enabled (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Majone, 1996). These transnational networks 
thus represent a horizontal dispersion of power and a different source of connection in a 
compound European executive order. As such, cooperation through transnational networks 
might be a source for agency autonomy, however only as long as the network are mainly 
independent and controlling their own portfolios and agenda. Yet, an increasing number of 
networks are currently steered by the Commission. The Commission might have established 
these networks itself, or they might have evolved through the Commissions gradual acquiring 
of existing networks (Levi-Faur, 2011; Trondal & Peters, 2013).  
As portrayed above, domestic agencies might be subject to cooperation and influence from a 
range of actors and institutions, situated across multiple tiers of governance. However, before 
the article by Egeberg and Trondal (2009), there was no research on the relative importance 
and influence of these different institutions on domestic agencies’ work with EU legislation. 
By examining whether policy formulation and implementation in a multilevel system either 
takes form indirectly through national governments, directly through Commission-steered 
domestic agencies, through transnational networks, or through compound implementation 
triggered by multiple sources of power, the results pointed towards the latter. As such, the 
main conclusion of the article point to that processes of EU policy making at the national 
level are compound, and that domestic agencies are at large influenced by several 
organizations simultaneously (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). In addition, a number of case 
studies on Norwegian regulatory agencies’ participation in MLA, show results that they seem 
to act as “multi-hatted” with connections to their respective ministries, the Commission, EU 
level agencies, and to “sister agencies” through transnational networks in varying degrees (see 
i.e. Egeberg, 2006). 
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The early research on MLA focused mainly on the role of domestic agencies in the 
implementation phase of EU regulation. The process of implementation refers to ‘the stage of 
the policy process at which EU legislation has already been transposed into national 
legislation and at which it is applied in practice by national (regulatory) authorities’ (Egeberg 
& Trondal, 2009, p. 779). According to Egeberg and his collaborators, national agencies tend 
to be “double-hatted” when they are putting EU legislation into practice. On the other hand, in 
policymaking processes, they tend to be mostly ministry-driven (Egeberg, 2006), and 
therefore not as interesting for the purpose of mapping the emergence of MLA. However, 
more recently conducted research has shown results that domestic agencies are equally, or 
even more, involved in MLA in the formulation phase than in the implementation phase. The 
formulation phase concerns the possibilities for national agencies to participate, either 
formally or actually, in the making of EU policy and regulation. According to Bach et.al. 
(2015), what they refer to as the differentiation hypothesis, transforms national agencies into 
mainly policy-developing international actors. The underlying reason behind such 
development is founded on the differentiated nature of the international environment, where 
policy formulation, to a certain extent has become a task for the supranational level, while the 
implementation of policies remains a national level responsibility (Bach et al., 2015). 
Based on previous research we can make theoretically founded assumptions about NVE’s 
potential participation in a compound European multilevel administration. The following 
section presents the theoretical research model. 
2.1.2 Research Model 
A compound model of MLA, with NVE as the focal point, is illustrated in the following 
figure 2.1. The model portrays NVE’s connection to the national government through the 
OED. NVE is also connected to the EU level, either directly to the Commission and DG 
Energy, or indirectly through the connection with ACER. The latter is the most plausible. 
Lastly, NVE is connected to “sister-regulators” in the Nordic and European countries through 
the transnational networks NordREG and CEER. These collaborators of NVE might be co-
existing or mutually complementing. They might be activated in various phases of a policy 
process and by different external features, or they might function more or less simultaneously 
(Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). 
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Figure 2.1 NVE’s potential connections in a compound model of multilevel European 
energy regulation (freely adapted from Egeberg & Trondal (2015)). Reg I-…n 
represents NVE’s sister regulators in the Nordic and European countries. 
With a starting point in the research model presented above, the following section will orbit 
around “unpacking” NVE’s relations to the different collaborators for the purpose of deducing 
some expectation of findings regarding NVE’s connection to these different organizations. 
When relevant and beneficial, there will be distinguished between connections in the policy 
implementation phase and the policy formulation phase. The expected findings are 
summarized in table 2.1 below. 
First of all, NVE is naturally connected to its “mother-ministry”, the OED. NVE is 
hierarchically placed beneath the OED, and one might expect the department to set guidelines 
for NVE’s daily functioning. Especially in terms of budget, evaluations, supervision and other 
forms of formal measures or evaluations. With regards to the more specific work on energy 
regulation, one might expect NVE to have more autonomy given the high degree of 
technicality. In addition, NVE is granted authority as the manager of Norwegian energy 
resources through the Energy Act (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2002). This law provides 
NVE with the authority to control and set guidelines for all aspects of usage of Norwegian 
energy resources. Except cross-border sales, an issue that is subject to mandatory control and 
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approval by the ministry. Substantive control by the ministry on NVE’s daily work on energy 
regulation nonetheless appears as unlikely. One might however expect some form of dialogue 
with regards to proposals for, and implementation of, new EU regulations. 
Second, the EU might stand out as a relevant connection for NVE. NVE’s connections to the 
EU level administration might take two forms, either directly to the Commission and DG 
Energy or indirectly through ACER. In the policy formulation phase one might expect NVE 
to be active in terms of affecting the EU level decisions on energy regulation that might end 
up with EEA relevance. In the policy implementation phase one might expect EEA relevant 
policies on energy regulation to have substantive effects on NVE’s work. We might also 
expect to see tendencies of EU administration pushing for uniform implementation of EU 
regulations, and thereby a certain extent of scrutiny from the EU level with regards to 
domestic implementation practices. One might also expect to see dialogue between NVE and 
ACER regarding implementation and practicing of EU regulation, especially in instances of 
uncertainty.  
Third, domestic agencies today seemingly connect to several “sister agencies” in other 
countries, often through involvement in transnational networks. In this case we are talking 
about NVE’s connections with energy regulators in the Nordic or European countries. One 
might expect frequent contact between NVE and its “sister”-regulators concerning energy 
regulation, for the purpose of assisting each other and for exchanging information and “best-
practices”. In addition, NVE itself mentions the transnational networks NordREG and CEER 
as some of their most central collaborators when it comes to European energy collaboration 
(Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, s.a.-b). Transnational networks might be relatively 
autonomous or they could be subject to steering by the Commission. Either way, one might 
expect to find elements of connections in both the implementation and the formulation phases. 
It is likely that NVE cooperates with similar energy regulators regarding implementation of 
EU regulations, especially if the EU is pushing for uniform implementation. In the 
formulation phase, these regulators might cooperate in order to obtain information and create 
a united front for affecting the policymaking at the supranational level. For a Norwegian 
regulator, cooperation with regulators from other countries might be especially important, 
since Norway is formally placed outside the EU and thereby has limited access to certain 
arenas of policymaking. 
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Lastly, we might assume several connections and sources of influence to be at work 
concurrently, making NVE subject to a compound form of steering and dialogue. Despite the 
formal placement of NVE below the OED, one cannot exclude contact between NVE and the 
Commission’s administration or “sister agencies” (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). As depicted 
here through how various actors are included in the model above. If NVE is part of a MLA, 
we might expect both formal and informal connections between NVE and these other actors 
with regards to the implementation of European energy regulation. We might also expect to 
find elements of contact between NVE and the other actors in the formulation phase, most 
likely with the goal of influencing the formulation of common European regulations. 
Following, we might expect NVE to have multiple administrative connections in their work 
with regulations of energy resources. 
In sum, based on the research model, we can expect connections between NVE and OED, in 
addition to connections to the EU’s administration and to “sister”-regulators through 
transnational networks. These connections might be activated simultaneously or the may be 
subject to differentiation. In some instances, NVE might be “two-hatted”, connected to the 
national and supranational administration. In other instances, NVE might be “multi-hatted”, 
simultaneously juggling connections with multiple actors. NVE might also have other 
connections, which are not included in this project (see chapter 1.1 for research limitations). 
However, in order to make claims about NVE’s participation in MLA, the agency needs to be 
at least “double-hatted”. Or else traditional state-centric steering might be the alternative, 
rendering the assumption of a European multilevel energy regulation implausible. A summary 
of the expected findings is presented in table 2.1 below. When relevant, a distinction between 
NVE’s connection in the implementation phase or the formulation phase is taken into account. 
The expected findings provide a foundation for the later analysis of the collected results. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of expected findings based on the theoretical framework of MLA. 
NVE’s connection… Expected findings 
To the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy 
(OED) 
1. OED has some degrees of formal control over NVE, 
especially with regards to budget, evaluation etc. 
2. NVE has a certain extent of autonomy on energy 
regulation, due to the technicality of the matter and their 
authority through the Energy Act. 
3. There is a certain dialogue between OED and NVE 
regarding the practicing of EU regulations. 
To the Commission’s 
administration 
4. NVE is active in the formulation phase of European energy 
regulation, especially if there are prospects of EEA 
relevance. 
5. Energy regulations with EEA relevance affect NVE’s 
regulatory work, especially in the implementation phases of 
policies. 
6. The EU administration supervises domestic implementation 
practices. 
7. There exists dialogue between NVE and ACER regarding 
implementation and practicing of EU regulations, 
especially in instances of uncertainty. 
To “sister”-regulators 
through NordREG and 
CEER 
8. Frequent dialogue and contact for mutual assist, and 
exchange of information and “best-practices” 
9. Cooperation regarding implementation of EU regulations. 
Especially if EU organizations are pushing for uniform 
implementation. 
10. Cooperation and exchanging information and “allying” to 
seek common influence in the formulation phase of energy 
regulation. 
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NVE’s connection… Expected findings 
To multiple actors 11. NVE has both formal and informal connections with 
multiple institutions and actors in the field of energy 
regulation 
12. NVE cooperates and seeks assistance with a multitude of 
actors in the implementation phase of energy regulation. 
13. NVE is actively cooperating with multiple actors in order to 
influence common energy regulation in the formulation 
phase. 
 
2.2 Organizational Theory 
Organization theory can provide explanations for why domestic agencies, such as NVE, 
connect with multiple organizations. One basic assumption behind organizational theory is the 
notion that how an institution is organized influences how it behaves. A wide range of 
previous research on MLA argues for the necessity of analysing the patterns and dynamics of 
the administrative capacities of the EU in order to fully grasp how the EU shapes European 
public policy (Bauer & Trondal, 2015a; Curtin & Egeberg, 2008; Olsen, 2007; Trondal, 
2010). These patterns and dynamics might be evident at all levels of governance, and they 
might affect how regulation or administration is conducted across levels. For instance, the 
emergence of MLA is ‘highly contingent upon particular organizational and institutional 
features at the national level’ (Egeberg, 2006, p. 14). On that note, certain organizational 
characteristics might function as beneficial independent variables for explaining NVE’s 
participation in compound European governance structures. 
Two particular organizational characteristics must be present in order to assume tendencies of 
MLA compound connections. First of all, this entails the degree to which domestic agencies 
are de-coupled from their respective ministries. Vertical specialization is explained in detail in 
chapter 2.2.1 below. Second, the emergence of MLA is dependent on the capacity of the 
supranational level. More specifically, whether the supranational institutions have adequate 
capacity to co-opt the partly de-coupled national agencies (chapter 2.2.2). In addition, 
organizational duplication (chapter 2.2.3.), horizontal specialization (chapter 2.2.4) and 
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degree of politicization of the field of energy regulation (chapter 2.2.5) are featured as further 
relevant explanatory variables with regards to researching the potentially compound 
administration of European energy regulation which NVE might take part of. The chapter on 
organizational theory concludes with a summarized presentation of the expected findings of 
the five different variables in table 2.2. 
2.2.1 Vertical Specialization 
Domestic agencies might be vertically specialized on two axes, either within one institution or 
between several institutions. Both specializations might exist simultaneously. 
If an agency is intra-organizationally specialized, it can be thought of as vertically divided 
within the organization. Regarding NVE, there will as such exist a clear division between 
NVE’s leadership and the lower level employees. Vertical contact within the institution is 
likely to be limited to formal questions, for instance related to budget, evaluation etc. This is 
often connected to the degree to which the lower level employees’ work tasks are 
characterized by technicality. If technicality is the case, then a higher degree of intra-vertical 
specialization might be expected. In addition, in case of intra-organizational vertical 
specialization, contact between the agency and the respective ministry will occur mainly 
through the agencies’ leadership. Following, the leadership will be more exposed to 
departmental influence and subject to signals thereof. Lower-level employees however, might 
be more vulnerable to exposure from the supranational organizations. These employees are 
often entitled to more narrow fields of responsibility and are often experts in their narrow 
field of interest. Following, they are expected to more often be in contact with the EU level 
regarding technical issues than their superiors (Trondal, 2010, 2011).  
Agencies might also be inter-organizational vertically specialized. This entails a formal 
separation between agency and ministry that leads to an agency that, to a lesser extent, is 
influenced by political processes at government level. As such, the agencies are often referred 
to as organized “at arm’s length” from their ministry, and they are consequently more 
autonomous and able to ‘establish close contacts with executive bodies at the EU level’ 
(Curtin & Egeberg, 2008, p. 640). Such contact largely occurs since the specialization makes 
the agencies more apt to make decisions based on technical or proficiency-based assessments, 
and thus contacts the EU regarding technical issues more often (Trondal, 2011). However, 
since inter-vertically specialized agencies have little contact with political leadership, the 
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national parliament or their superior ministries, they are also to a lesser extent able to 
influence national political decisions. 
Expected findings 
NVE’s regulatory behaviour is expected to follow the agency’s vertical organization. NVE is 
formally organized as a national regulator formally placed below the OED. We might 
therefore expect a certain amount of contact between these two actors. However, NVE is an 
agency characterized by technicality and sector specialization. As such, we might expect most 
contact between NVE and the ministry to take place through NVE’s leadership. The OED’s 
control over the agency most likely takes the form of budget control, evaluations and other 
formal steering mechanisms. Following this line of though, we might also expect the lower 
level employees of NVE to be subject to little influence from or little contact with the OED. 
They function mainly as technical experts and are expected to be largely autonomous when 
working with technical matters, such as the practising of energy regulation. We might also 
expect limited contact between the different levels within NVE as an organization. 
In sum, the vertical organization of NVE might lead us to expect little departmental steering 
on the issue of energy regulation. As such, the possibilities for OED to control NVE is 
reduced, which in turn opens up possibilities for more compound connections between NVE 
and the other relevant organizations, such as those at the supranational level or the 
transnational networks. 
2.2.2 Supranational Capacity 
In addition to vertical specialization, the existence of MLA rests on another organizational 
condition. National agencies should be organized at arm’s length from their “parent” 
ministries, making them available for re-coupling with the supranational level. However, the 
re-coupling of national administrative sub-units is dependent upon an adequate administrative 
capacity at the supranational level (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2015). In other words, 
in order for national agencies to connect to supranational organizations, the institutional 
environment is dependent upon a certain amount of centre formation at the EU level and a 
certain degree of strength of these organizations. As such, the role of the Commission and the 
other EU level organizations will be subject to variation, regarding their relative institutional 
strength in the specific policy fields (Egeberg, 2015). 
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Regarding energy policy and regulation, the existence of MLA and whether NVE will connect 
to organizations at the EU level, will therefore depend upon the strength and capacity of the 
Commission, DG Energy and ACER. Furthermore, it will depend upon whether these 
organizations have the capacity to co-opt and steer NVE and the transnational networks NVE 
might be part of.  
The later years have brought about increased executive power for the Commission. In 
addition, the Commission is institutionally separated from steering by the member states or 
the Council. These developments together are thought to trigger centrifugal forces for units of 
national governments (Egeberg, 2006). The Commission has thus generally increased its 
strength and abilities to co-opt national agencies. In parallel, the EU has increased its 
executive function further through the establishment of a range of EU-level agencies, such as 
ACER. ACER was established in 2009 as part of a third energy market package15, together 
with a range of other measures for streamlining the European energy sector. These measures 
were established with the purpose of increased uniformity in the sector and further energy 
market integration. The EU also established the NC procedure16 that would oblige national 
energy regulators to perform executive-administrative tasks at the EU level via the new 
agency (Jevnaker, 2015). In addition, ACER is often mentioned in research literature as a 
powerful EU-level agency with ‘a strong and institutionalized position in policy-making and 
competencies [in] making binding, single-case decisions’ (Ruffing, 2015, p. 1117). With the 
inclusion of the third package, ACER also took over far-reaching competencies regarding 
regulation of the energy market. Together, the establishment and functioning of ACER can be 
perceived as part of building a supranational capacity within the energy sector (Jevnaker, 
2015; Ruffing, 2015). 
Expected findings 
The energy sector is a sector in which the EU level organizations have substantial capacity 
and competence. We might therefore expect to see clear signs of connections between NVE 
                                                
15 The third energy package 2009-2011 is the latest round of energy market legislation 
‘enacted to improve the functioning of the internal energy market and resolve structural 
problems’ (European Commission Energy, s.a.-b). 
16 The Procedure for Developing Network Codes is a procedure developed in 2009 for 
regulating policymaking within the electricity sector, and thereby ensuring uniformity and 
common rules and regulations throughout the EU and the internal energy market. The 
procedure also provided ACER with substantial tasks and responsibility in phases of 
policymaking within the energy sector (Jevnaker, 2015). 
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and the organizations at the supranational level. As previously mentioned, the early research 
on MLA advocated for why domestic agencies would be most involved and influenced in the 
policy implementation phase of EU regulation (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). 
More recently conducted research has however shown that domestic agencies are equally, or 
even more, involved in MLA in the formulation phase than the implementation phase (Bach 
et al., 2015). Whether this project provides results for NVE’s connection with the EU 
administration in the implementation or the formulation phase of energy regulation remains to 
be seen through analysing the collected results. 
2.2.3 Organizational Duplication 
Organizational duplication between institutions entails that they to a certain extent function 
within the same areas of work and responsibility. By having several institutions conducting 
similar work, one creates foundations for comparison, cooperation, increased learning and 
possibilities for exchanging “best practices” and information. Whilst vertical specialization 
might entail a loss of ministerial control over a domestic agency, organizational duplication 
might function as a strategy for the ministries to gain control. By developing new, 
overlapping sub-units within the ministries, with similar portfolios as the agency, the ministry 
might be able to regain steering control, at least to a certain extent. As such, the overlapping 
units creates new ties of cooperation (Trondal, 2011). Lack of duplication between an agency 
and a ministry however increases the agency’s autonomy and thereby the possibility for more 
international connection. 
Expected findings 
Organizational duplication is expected to strengthen relations between the organizations 
involved. If NVE and the OED have sub-units with seemingly similar portfolios, it increases 
the possibilities for tight connections between the two organizations and subsequent 
ministerial control. We might then expect employees from NVE to be more apt to ministerial 
steering in the policy implementation phase. Following, lack of duplication might reduce 
ministerial steering and rather open up the possibility for NVE to make connections with the 
Commission’s administration and the “sister”-regulators through NordREG and CEER. Lack 
of duplication might also make the Commission less apt to go through OED for contact with 
NVE, and thereby lays the foundation for more direct contact between NVE and the EU level 
organizations. 
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2.2.4 Horizontal Specialization 
Horizontal specialization refers to how work is organized and divided within and between 
organizations. It provides foundations for organizations’ boundaries and possible routes of 
cooperation. While certain forms of horizontal specialization might provide for extensive 
activities between different actors, other forms might hinder such activity (Egeberg, 
Gornitzka, & Trondal, forthcoming). Horizontal specialization comes in a series of 
arrangements. It might take the form of territorial or sectorial specialization, or take place by 
process or clientele (Gulick, 1947). In this particular case, specialization according to sector 
appears the most relevant. Mainly because the Commission is organized by sector and NVE is 
a national sectorial agency. The three remaining options are deemed less relevant for the 
purpose of this project, and will therefore not be mentioned any further. 
Sectorial specialization ‘is thought to evoke [sectorial] cleavages among decision-makers and 
to foster policy standardization within a particular policy field across territorial units’ 
(Egeberg et al., forthcoming). When departmental structures at the administrative level are 
organized according to sector, it is expected to evoke sectorial identities among the civil 
servants. This might ultimately lead to sectorial connections between civil servants of 
differing institutions. This applies not only for the Commission’s administrations, but also for 
public administration in general (Egeberg, 2012; Egeberg et al., forthcoming; Trondal, 
Marcussen, Larsson, & Veggeland, 2010). 
Expected findings 
Employees who work on European energy regulation in NVE, at the EU level, or in the sister-
regulators in other countries are expected to develop cross-border cooperation due to the 
sectorial specialization of the policy field. Horizontal specialization thereby increases the 
possibilities for mutual influence between these actors in both down- and upstream processes 
of energy regulative policies. This ultimately provides foundations for increased European 
uniformity of energy regulation. 
Horizontal specialization is also expected to encourage resource pooling among participants 
of transnational networks. This is due to how the networks bring together officials from 
different units with compatible organizational structures and shared sector affiliations, which 
are further likely to focus on similar problems and solutions. This pooling of administrative 
resources might take place in two ways: 
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[First], network participants routinely interact and share valuable assets such as 
knowledge, information, practices and experiences; second, there is a routinized 
division of labour in the network, with network participants mutually adapting and 
specializing in different types of tasks and different fields of expertise (Vestlund, 
2015). 
Thus, we might expect NVE to pool administrative resources when they participate in the 
transnational networks. The pooling of resources is expected to take place through the 
exchanging of information etc., in addition to dividing tasks between the participants. 
2.2.5 Degree of Politicization 
Whether domestic agencies’ are more connected to their respective ministries or to other 
organizations depends on the degree of politicization of the policy field. Previous research has 
found results for how the role of national ministries in the implementation phase of EU 
legislation is enhanced if the legislation is politically contested (Egeberg, 2006). As such, the 
importance of the parent ministry depends of the level of politicization.  The more political 
contestation and public debate, the more national agency personnel assign weight to signals 
from national executive politicians (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). One might expect the parent 
ministry to take the lead at the application stage if dossiers become highly politicized and 
contested (Egeberg & Trondal, 2015). 
If the policy field is characterized by a low degree of politicization, one might expect less 
interference and control by the ministerial department and the national government. This 
increases agency autonomy and further opens up opportunities for more connections between 
the domestic agency and other organizations. 
Expected findings 
Energy regulation can by large be thought of as a highly politicized policy area. Particularly 
in Norway, where energy policy and resources are often deemed key national interests. As 
such, we might expect a high degree of politicization and a large extent of interference from 
the ministry on the practising of EU energy regulation. 
In the policy formulation phase, the potential degree of politicization might be less evident 
and we might therefore expect domestic agencies as NVE to enjoy more autonomy in this 
phase. This assumption follows in line with the argument by Bach, Ruffing and Yesilkagit 
(2015), that the role of domestic agencies will remain relatively unchanged in the 
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implementation phase of policies. Rather, domestic agencies are more autonomous and 
become more internationally active in the formulation phase of policymaking. Creating ties of 
connection with supranational actors when it comes to influencing and participating in policy 
formulating arenas (Bach et al., 2015). 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of expected findings based on organization theory. 
Organizational 
variable 
Expected findings 
Vertical 
specialization 
14. Contact between NVE and OED takes place mainly through NVE’s 
leadership. 
15. OED’s control and steering of NVE is conducted mainly through 
budget control, evaluations and other formal steering mechanisms. 
16. Lower level employees of NVE experience little or no influence or 
contact with OED. 
17. The vertical organization of NVE opens up for connections between 
the agency and other actors. 
18. Vertical contact within NVE is limited, and mostly takes place 
through formal steering mechanisms such as budget and evaluations. 
Supranational 
capacity 
19. Clear signs of connections between NVE and actors at the 
supranational level. 
Organizational 
duplication 
20. Duplication between NVE and OED is expected to increase the 
departmental control, and to make NVE’s employees more apt to 
departmental steering with regards to energy regulation. 
21. Lack of duplication between NVE and OED is expected to reduce 
departmental steering, and provide foundations for more direct 
contact between NVE and the Commission’s administration or the 
“sister”-regulators. 
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Organizational 
variable 
Expected findings 
Horizontal 
specialization 
22. Sectorial specialization provides foundations for cooperation between 
civil servant who work on energy regulation in NVE, at the 
supranational level, and in “sister-agencies” or transnational 
networks, both in the implementation and the formulation phase of 
energy regulation. 
23. NVE is expected to pool administrative resources with its 
collaborators, especially through the transnational networks. This 
pooling of resources takes place through, 1) exchanging information 
etc., 2) dividing tasks within the network. 
Degree of 
politicization 
24. Due to degree of politicization we might expect substantial 
ministerial steering in the implementation phase of EU regulations. 
25. Politicization is likely less evident in the formulation phase, and we 
might therefore expect NVE to be more autonomous in this phase of 
energy regulation. 
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3 Methodology 
This project is a case study of NVE, and NVE’s participation in a European multilevel model 
of energy regulation. The purpose is to examine the connections of NVE to the Commission, 
ACER, NordREG, CEER, and to the OED. The chosen research design and method should 
therefore provide an opportunity for collecting results that can help analyse whether and how 
such connections take place, in addition to examining why they might occur. As such, the 
research of this project is part descriptive and part analytical. What the choice and usage of a 
case study as research design implies, is explained in detail in chapter 3.1. 
In order to get hold of information on how NVE connects to the group of collaborators, a 
range of in-depth interviews were conducted with employees of the EMR of NVE. The 
project is a typical qualitative study, which relates to an interpretative paradigm, and which 
focuses on the informants' experience and opinion formation (Tjora, 2010). The choice for, 
and the usage of interviews as research method is elaborated further in chapter 3.2. In 
addition, the information gathered from the interviews is united with information gathered 
from a certain extent of document analysis. The methodological aspects of document analysis 
are elaborated in chapter 3.3. By including information from public documents, the 
respondent’s perception of connections between NVE and the collaborators are examined in 
relation to the formal associations between the institutions. The empirics are thus based on a 
certain extent of triangulation that ultimately helps secure the quality of the results (chapter 
3.4.1). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodological qualities and 
challenges of the chosen research design and methodology, followed by a brief summary. 
3.1 Case Study 
Case study as research design may be defined as an in-depth study of a single unit, where the 
aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena (Gerring, 2004). In this 
context, NVE is singled out as the preferred unit, and the purpose is to elucidate some features 
of how this agency takes part in MLA. The degree to which we are able to make claims about 
“a larger class of similar phenomena” is however debatable. NVE is a unique case, and even 
though other Norwegian agencies might be involved in MLA in a similar manner, they might 
constitute fundamentally structural or organizational differences. As such, we should be 
careful with generalizing the findings from NVE to a bigger whole. As mentioned in the 
initial chapter, similar studies have already been conducted for a range of Norwegian agencies 
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within other policy sectors. The research conducted in this project might therefore fill in 
another piece of the puzzle by contributing to an increasing understanding of how the EU 
affects Norwegian administrative patterns at several levels of governance. 
Case studies may be useful when seeking to gain deeper knowledge of either a specific 
incident, a particular context or to evolve a theoretical framework (Jacobsen, 2005). In this 
setting, the purpose has been to gain a deeper understanding of one particular context, defined 
here as NVE. Through the collected findings, the interest lies in capturing the employees’ 
perceptions of NVE’s actual participation in MLA, in addition to whatever formal 
connections that exists. An in-depth study of one particular case, without necessary prospect 
of generalization, is often called an intrinsic case study. The purpose of an intrinsic case study 
is to examine one case in detail, and to elucidate features that are critical for this particular 
case (Stake, 1995). However, it might be possible to connect the results to general theory 
(Ringdal, 2007). Through the validation or rejection of our “expected findings” we might be 
able to contribute to increased understanding of MLA as a theoretical framework. As such, 
this case study follows a deductive logic, where our “expected findings” are deduced from 
general law and is tested against reality by looking for circumstances that confirm or 
disconfirm it (Gibbs, 2007). The case selection is in that respect based on an objection to 
build and test general causal theories about the social world on the basis of one case 
(Seawright & Gerring, 2008). 
This project thus provides an opportunity to examine NVE as a case study in detail, to expand 
the field of administrative case studies and to gain deeper knowledge of how the EU affects 
Norwegian domestic administrative systems. While these are some of the strengths of the 
chosen research design, the design and methodology also involves a major challenge. This 
refers to the difficulty of making assumptions of a relationship that is only examined from one 
side. When making claims about the connections between NVE and the other organizations 
included in this project, we must bear in mind that the results are based mainly on the 
perception of NVE’s employees. 
The choice of conducting a case study of NVE is also based on pragmatic reasons. In order to 
grasp the characteristics of how NVE connects to other actors in policymaking processes, it is 
useful to gain information from those who are actually involved in these processes. Limiting 
to a single case makes the project feasible and corresponds well with the breadth of the 
project. The chosen case is further limited to NVE’s work on the policy processes of 
European energy regulation, and its European connections on that subject. As such, the 
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research in this project is naturally geared towards the employees of NVE who might possess 
information about this topic. Information is gathered through conducting interviews with 
relevant employees of NVE. 
In sum, a case study research might be preferred when inferences are descriptive rather than 
causal, when depth is prized over breadth, when internal case comparability is given 
precedence over external representativeness, when insight into causal mechanisms is more 
important than insight into causal effects, when the strategy of research is explanatory rather 
than confirmatory, and when useful variance is available for only a single unit (Gerring, 
2004). 
3.2 Interviews 
According to Jacobsen (2005), conducting interviews is a beneficial method for three reasons. 
First of all, interviewing as a research method is useful when we are examining relatively few 
units. Second, it is beneficial when we are interested in the meanings or opinions of 
individuals. Last, interviews are often used when we are interested in how certain individuals 
construe and add meaning to specific phenomena (Jacobsen, 2005). Based on these three 
criteria, the choice of interviews as research method corresponds well with the purpose of this 
project. While it may be time consuming and subject to challenges that would not be present 
with the usage of alternative methods such as collecting survey data, personal interviews 
provides an opportunity to go into detail on the topic in matter. It also allows for the 
respondents to digress on personal experiences, where in-depth perceptions become 
accessible. In addition, follow-up questions might be presented and the interview questions 
might be altered or improved continuously, in order to access the wanted information. 
One pertinent challenge with the chosen methodology, as with similar studies that are based 
on either interviews or for instance survey data, is how the observations and information ‘rest 
on the perceptions of the respondents. Admittedly, there are no guarantees that actors’ 
perceptions of behaviour always reflect actual behaviour. The study of actors’ perceptions 
render the conclusions vulnerable to perceptual errors’ (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p. 784)17. 
Nonetheless, this research project is interested in capturing the actual mechanisms in which 
NVE connects to European collaborators, and how the employees perceive such cooperation. 
As such, the personal perceptions are precisely what we are after. 
                                                
17 See also Trondal (2011). 
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The main part of the empirical collection of this project is based on in-depth personal 
interviews with employees of the EMR in NVE. Contact was first established with one of 
EMR’s section heads. First through an informal conversation of the telephone, followed up by 
contact over e-mail. This person was presented with information about the project, and based 
on this information collected a group of relevant informants. In order to get an impression of 
possible variations regarding the opinions of NVE’s participation in European MLA, 
informants with different employment positions were interviewed. The leadership of NVE 
was excluded, since the lower level personnel of the agency is often better placed 
organizationally to appraise the role that various institutions and actors play within the policy 
processes, since they are the ones who actually deal with EU policy processes (Egeberg & 
Trondal, 2009). For the purpose of ensuring their anonymity, the respondent’s identities will 
not be further exposed throughout this project. Reported information from the interviews used 
in the following chapters is marked by an in-text reference. When relevant, the number of the 
interview is included, for the purpose of separating whether the information was one person’s 
perception, or if it is universal among all the interviewees. After the interviews were 
conducted, some the respondents also provided some additional information and answered 
some specific follow-up questions via e-mail. Information from these exchanges is followed 
by separate in-text references, for the purpose of separating which information stems from 
where. 
The interview guide was constructed based on an example guide from Tjora (2010), 
containing open thematic questions and detailed follow-up questions under each theme (see 
appendix B). The interviews were, for pragmatic reasons, conducted during the span of one 
week in the winter of 2016. Four interviews were planned, however only three were 
conducted due to illness of one of the respondents. All interviews had an average timespan of 
approximately one hour. 
Tjora (2010) further recommends that interviews are held at places where the respondents feel 
secure and comfortable, since that might lay the foundation for an open conversation. If the 
research is geared towards the respondent’s work, their office or workplace is a preferable 
environment. Even though it is possible to conduct such interviews over the telephone or by 
e-mail, which is a cost-efficient solution, it is often preferred to carry the interviews out in 
person. This is reasoned in how personal interviews create a more fertile environment for 
confidentiality and the free conversation (Jacobsen, 2005). The respondents might also feel 
more secure if they meet their interviewer in person. It has also been claimed that impersonal 
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interviews, such as by telephone, might make the respondents more apt to adapt the truth or 
give incomplete answers since the interviewer is not present to detect insecurities or to probe 
for more complete responses (Frey & Oishi, 1995). Based on these reasons it was chosen to 
conduct the interviews in a private meeting room at NVE’s headquarters in Oslo. Experienced 
as a familiar and safe environment where the respondents potentially would feel comfortable 
to talk freely. In addition, as the questions were related to their work, it seemed natural to 
conduct the interviews at their place of work. At the end of each interview I asked for the 
consent of my respondents to contact them by telephone or e-mail if I had any supplementary 
questions or needed to clarify any of the responses. Something all of them were positive to. 
The planned course of events was to make sound recordings of all the interviews and later 
transcribe them into written text, which is the preferred method when conducting in-depth 
interviews. Making use of recordings should however always be subject to the consent of the 
respondents, which was not granted for this project. Being denied the possibility to make 
sound recording of the interviews created several challenges. First of all, in order to collect 
information from the interviews, notes were written on the computer throughout the 
interviews. It became obvious that the computer was an element of disturbance, which 
possibly might have disrupted an otherwise fertile environment for open conversation. 
Making notes by hand was therefore considered, but that might present an equal disturbance, 
in addition to making it increasingly difficult to preserve correct information. Secondly, since 
it was needed to make notes simultaneously as conducting the interviews, the tasks became 
more time consuming. One hour for each interview was planned, but because of the multi-
tasking, one hour quickly became too scarce. Some topics of the interview needed to be cut 
short, and relevant information might therefore have been left out. Lastly, since the 
information from the interviews can only be deemed as relatively precise, using direct 
quotations when presenting the results has been avoided, as the following chapter will show. 
The presented results will therefore not come off with the level of vividness that was 
originally intended. Also, it is a possibility that the notes from the interviews are coloured by 
the subjectivity of the interviewer. It was however sought to preserve the quality of the 
information through immediately “filling out” the written notes after conducting the 
interviews, with the information fresh in mind. In addition, the notes were sent back to the 
respondents which themselves were able to fill in additional information or answer any 
questions if some aspects of the interviews had been left unclear. Thus attempting to preserve 
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the quality of the results as best as possible, and to reduce any chances of misperceptions on 
the interviewers behalf. 
In an ideal situation, the number of conducted interviews would be significantly higher. When 
conducting qualitative interviews one might eventually meet a saturation point, which is 
marked by the lack of new information or new perspectives on certain aspects. The research 
conducted in this project did not reach this point, and the information source thus remains 
somewhat untapped. Any claims or conclusion of the report must therefore be read in light of 
the practical limitations and the restrictions this entails for making inferences. 
3.3 Document Analysis 
The information from the conducted interviews is coupled with information from a certain 
extent of document analysis. Document analysis allows us to access information from 
documents that were originally produced for other purposes than research (Tjora, 2010). 
‘Because they were originally created outside of the scope of the research, documents can 
provide a rich source of data’ (Olson, 2009, p. 320). A document analysis might either be 
used as the sole research method, or most often for the purpose of gathering additional or 
background data on the subject, for instance in order to supplement information gathered from 
interviews or observational studies (Tjora, 2010). In this project, document analysis is used 
for the latter purpose. Thus supplementing the information provided through the interviews. 
By including document analysis in this project it has enabled gaining information about the 
connections between NVE and its collaborators from different perspectives, which 
consequently might increase the quality of the gathered empirics as a whole. The documents 
are mainly used for the purpose of gathering information about the formal connections 
between the actors, thereby filling-out the information gathered through the interviews. While 
the respondents give useful accounts of how they perceive the interaction between the 
different organizations, document analysis provides us with the opportunity to examine how 
these connections formally are. Using multiple sources of data thus allows for building up a 
rich archive, or ‘a diverse collection of materials that enable you to engage with and think 
about the specific research problems or questions’ (Rapley, 2007, p. 10) from multiple angles. 
Documents used in analysis might be of varying character. They might be case specific, as for 
instance annual reports or information from web pages of a specific organization. Or they 
might be more general documents, as for instance official political documents or the like. 
They might also be previous research, such as articles, reports, books and similar (Tjora, 
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2010). The list of documents examined in this project varies across all these categories. 
Including Norwegian official reports (NOU) and official EU documents, such as Commission 
Working Papers, Commission Green Papers, regulations, directives and meeting notes. In 
addition, some documents of previous research and historical accounts of NVE’s have been 
included. Also, NVE’s documents of strategy and annual reports have been subject to 
examination, in addition to OED’s letters of allocation from the part three years. Some basic 
information regarding the institutions has been accessed through Internet resources, such as 
home pages and informational web sites.  
Making use of two methods, and thereby having multiple sources of information might 
consequently increase the empirical quality. An extended discussion on the use of 
triangulation follows in the next sub-chapter. 
3.4 Methodological Qualities and Challenges 
The chosen research design and methodology is not adequately assesses without a 
consideration of the qualities and challenges it might entail. This topic makes up for the 
concluding part of this chapter. 
3.4.1 Triangulation 
‘By getting more than one different view on a subject, an accurate (or more accurate) view on 
the subject matter can be obtained’ (Gibbs, 2007, p. 94). These differing views can be based 
on different samples and datasets, different investigators, or multiple research methodologies 
and theories (Gibbs, 2007). In this context, the former has been in use, in terms of different 
samples and datasets. Gibbs defines this as making use of ‘chronologically and 
geographically disparate data from interviews, observations and documents’ (Gibbs, 2007, p. 
94). By coupling information from documents about the formal connections between NVE 
and the collaborators, with information on how these connections actually work from the 
interviews, a more accurate and detailed account of the topic becomes accessible. 
Using multiple methods in research has however been subject to criticism. Silverman (2000) 
for instance, is sceptical to the use of multiple methods and triangulation, since it complicates 
the analysis, and might lead to ‘under-analysed data and an imprecise or theoretically 
indigestible research problem’ (Silverman, 2000, p. 99). What seems evident is however that 
we need to be aware of how information gathered from documents and from interviews are 
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different kinds of information. Therefore, they cannot be analysed in the same way. Also, by 
following what is deemed Fielding and Fielding’s (1986) ground rules of triangulation, we 
might be able to make beneficial use of triangulation for the purpose of ensuring the quality of 
this research. According to these rules, triangulation should always begin from a theoretical 
perspective, and one should choose methods and data that will give an account of structure 
and meaning from within that perspective (Silverman, 2000). Making use of multiple methods 
in this project is theoretically funded, since it allows us to grasp more of the complexities of 
NVE’s connections, through examining both formal and actual contact. The use of 
triangulation for the purpose of combining information from the interviews with information 
from document analysis might thus increase the reliability and validity of the results.  
Triangulation might minimize the risk for objective mistakes and misperception, in addition 
to increasing the possibility for consistent information by having several sources of 
information. Also, using multiple methods increases breadth in the collected empirics, and 
generates a more thorough set of explanations (Gibbs, 2007). 
3.4.2 Generalizability 
The purpose of research is often to generalize the results. Applying the findings to “a bigger 
whole” and making inferences to a larger population. For qualitative studies in general, and 
for case studies in particular, the possibility of generalization is often subject to discussion. 
When the research sample is not randomized, but rather chosen on the grounds of availability 
or by deliberate design, the potential for making inferences back to an entire population 
becomes difficult18. Therefore, we need to make informed distinctions between what several 
authors refer to as statistical generalization and analytical generalization (Kvale, 2001; Yin, 
2014). The first term, which is the most commonly used, refers to generalization as when ‘an 
inference is made about a population…on the basis of empirical data collected from a sample’ 
(Yin, 2014, p. 40). This kind of generalization is especially suited for the results of 
quantitative studies. When conducting a qualitative case study however, the second kind of 
generalization is, according to Yin (2014), more suitable. The aim of the research becomes to 
shed empirical light on theoretical concepts or principles. The results might then be 
generalized as a way to reinterpret the results of existing studies on other cases, or to define 
new research focusing on new cases. According to Egeberg (2006), case studies similar to the 
                                                
18 See Kvale (2001, pp. 160-163) for supplementary examples. 
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one in this project helps create an insight into how ‘political systems that acquire similar 
institutional and organizational features to those of the EU at the system and sub-system level 
would probably have a larger propensity than others to develop similar patterns of executive 
politics as well’ (Egeberg, 2006, p. 200). In addition, by making the results and arguments 
specific and explicit (Kvale, 2001), some generalizations, concept or principles might be 
applicable to other cases which on the outset are not ultimately similar (Yin, 2014). 
Following, the possibility of generalizing from the results from this project is present, 
however one should think of it as analytical generalization. As such, we might expect cases 
with similar organizational features to be subject to similar results. We might also use the 
results from this research to define a new research focus, or to develop theoretical concepts or 
principles that can be furthered to future research. 
3.4.3 Ethical Consideration 
Any type of research should be subject to ethical considerations. In this project, with the 
presence of an interview situation, there will for instance occur an asymmetric power 
structure. The interviewer defines the situation, presents the topics and controls the 
conversation by asking question. This entails that one needs to be aware of the fragile balance 
between the collection of information and the ethical aspects of an emotional, human 
interaction (Kvale, 2001). Extensive preparation is therefore necessary in order to achieve 
well-conducted interviews. It is essential to gain extensive knowledge about the topic 
beforehand, to be explicit in the purpose of research, and to be aware of different interview 
techniques beforehand (Kvale, 2001), in order to create a professional and confidential 
environment for conducting interviews. 
The privacy of my respondents has been thoroughly preserved, in accordance with the NESH 
ethical guidelines for social sciences and humanities19 (National Committees for Research 
Ethics in Norway, 2006). The respondents were provided with information prior to their 
participation, both about the project itself and about how any provided information would be 
                                                
19  The Norwegian National Research Ethics Committees are independent agencies for 
questions regarding research ethics, and investigation of misconduct, within all subject areas. 
In 2006, the committee for social sciences and humanities handed out a publication for the 
ethical guidelines in social sciences, law and humanities, which is taking into consideration in 
the research of this project (see https://www.etikkom.no/en/ for more information). 
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stored, for how long, and who would have access to it. Thereby also following Gibbs’ 
recommendation about “the fully informed consent”. This concept entails that: 
‘[Participants] in research should know exactly what they are letting themselves in for, 
what will happen to them during the research, and what will happen to the data they 
provide after the research is completed. They should be made aware of this before 
research on them starts and they should be given the option to withdraw from the 
research at any time and usually, if they request it, any data that have been collected 
from them will be returned or destroyed’ (2007, p. 8). 
The possibility of either direct or indirect personal recognition of any of my respondents has 
been disabled throughout this research process. As such, their anonymity has been preserved 
to the extent possible. In addition, no personal or sensitive information has been gathered 
through the course of the project. Based on the guidelines provided by NSD20, it was therefore 
deemed unnecessary to submit a notification concerning the research project (Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services, s.a.). 
3.4.4 Validity and Reliability 
The quality of a research design is often judged by its validity and reliability. However, it is 
disputed whether these terms are relevant when in comes to qualitative research (Ringdal, 
2007). A brief review of these terms in relation to this project might nonetheless be useful for 
the purpose of raising awareness of the project’s quality. 
First of all, we might ask ourselves whether the chosen method itself is suited for answering 
the research questions which are set forth (Jacobsen, 2005). Since we are interested in how 
the employees of NVE perceive of the agency’s participation in European administrative 
structures with multiple collaborators, a case study and conducting interviews corresponds 
well with the research focus, and the validity of the research design is attended to on that 
matter. 
Secondly, the degree of reliability is affected by potential research errors (Ringdal, 2007). For 
instance, based on the inter-subjectivity of using interviews as research method, the reliability 
                                                
20 The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) is the Data Protection Official for 
most research conducted in Norway. They provide guidelines for when and if research 
projects need to be reported, and prefabricated schemes for handing in notifications (see 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/english/ for more information). 
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of the findings might be influenced. Ones own position, knowledge and opinions might affect 
the results, and consequently the research (Tjora, 2010). As already mentioned, making 
written notes during the interviews might also affect the quality of the results, as the notes 
may become influenced by the interviewers interpretation of what is being stated. The 
respondents were given the opportunity to look over the notes after the interviews, thus to a 
certain extent securing the reliability of the results, as any mistakes would have been 
corrected by the informants. In addition, the use of triangulation has helped preserve both the 
reliability and the validity of the project. 
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4 Results 
The results gathered through this project are presented in this chapter. It consists of 
descriptive accounts of the structure of NVE and the other organizations that are included, in 
addition to accounts of the connections NVE has to the OED, to the EU level organizations, 
and to the transnational networks. Chapter 4.1 presents how energy regulation is organized at 
the national level, with focus on NVE’s history and structure, in addition to its connection to 
the OED. Chapter 4.2 goes into detail on how energy regulation is organized at the EU level, 
with the Commission, DG Energy and ACER. In chapter 4.3 the transnational networks 
NordREG and CEER are presented, and special attention is devoted to the role NVE has in 
these networks. The chapter concludes with an account of how NVE takes part in the 
implementation and development processes of European energy regulation, before a summary 
of the most important findings is presented in chapter 4.5. 
The results demonstrate that NVE is perceived as relatively autonomous at the national level, 
while being closely connected to its sister-regulators internationally. The Nordic regulators 
are perceived as NVE’s most central collaborators, and NordREG as the most important 
forum for cooperation. This seems to be the case in both the down- and upstream process of 
policymaking. Simultaneously, and to varying degrees, NVE also has connections to the OED 
and to some of the other organizations. Most of these connections, and especially NVE’s 
contact with OED, is characterized by the exchange of information and technical advice. 
Further, NVE’s possibilities for international connections appear to be affected by the lacking 
of full membership at several arenas, or by the lacking inclusion of the newest EU energy 
regulations in Norway. A detailed presentation of the findings follows, before they are 
summarized in chapter 4.5. Ultimately, the findings provides us with a foundation for drawing 
lines back to the theoretical assumption, which is the purpose of chapter 5 below. 
4.1 National Level Energy Regulation 
NVE was formally established in 1921 through a merging of several establishments, and is 
today formally placed beneath the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED). NVE’s 
headquarter is based in Oslo, and they have five regional offices. By the end of 2014, NVE 
had 588 employees with multidisciplinary competences (Norges vassdrags- og 
energidirektorat, 2015b). Though they are formally placed beneath the OED, NVE is mainly 
perceived to be a relatively autonomous professional agency. 
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Historically, NVE’s roots might be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century 
when the first public organ for managing the country’s water resources was established. 
Within less than one hundred years, these resources became interesting for producing power 
and electricity. As such, the history of NVE is also the history of one of the first signs of 
central steering of natural resources. The Norwegian Parliament quickly discovered the need 
for legal regulation within the energy sector, and whilst these tasks where at first managed by 
the Department for work, the tasks grew rapidly and the need for a common management of 
both the national power supply and the electrical system became apparent. As a common 
management agency for water and energy, NVE began its work in 1921 (Faugli, 2012). 
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, NVE was subject to major changes, as 
the trends of “New Public Management” (NPM) spread across Europe. In 1989, an official 
Norwegian report was published, providing detailed information of how public services in 
Norway could and should be better organized (NOU 1989:5, 1989). Inspired by marked-based 
thinking, the new Energy Act of 1991 came into play, and the energy sector was reorganized 
in order to ensure competition and efficiency of power production. Power production became 
subject to free market competition, whilst monopolies of power grid activity and power 
distribution were implemented (Faugli, 2012). Following, NVE was granted authority of 
regulating the market by handling all instances of power concession applications (Austvik & 
Claes, 2011). Later, in 1998, the current name “Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate” was established in order to clarify that NVE was an administrative agency, and 
not a producer of energy (Faugli, 2012). 
The organizational structure of NVE appears as most other public agencies. The agency is 
headed by a Director General and staff that comprises of an International Section and an 
Information & Public Relations Office. In addition, NVE has seven underlying departments. 
One of these departments is the administration, while the six others have responsibilities for 
specific policy areas ranging from energy regulation and power operation management, to the 
regulation of natural resources or disaster management. Each department is further divided 
into varying numbers of sections, which are responsible for specific tasks, and which has its 
own Head of Section (see appendix C). One of the departments is the EMR, which is the 
national regulator of the power market and grid system in Norway (Norges vassdrags- og 
energidirektorat, 2015a), and which is the main focus of this research project for reasons 
advocated in the initial chapter. 
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Since most of NVE’s underlying departments are responsible for highly diverse areas, the 
contact between the departments are reported as minimal. EMR does however report contact 
with some sections of different departments, when certain tasks that span across different 
fields of responsibility are on the agenda. Contact between sections mainly manifests through 
mutual exchange of information and expertise, or by orders from EMR. EMR might for 
instance order flow and price analysis from the department of Energy Systems. Formal 
exchange of information between sectors is subject to the agreement of the section heads 
(Interviews NVE, 2016). 
Each department has its own director, which meets weekly with the Directorate General to 
discuss relevant media publications, principal decision-making or organizational questions 
(Mail NVE, 2016). The director group is in charge of the broad lines of NVE’s work, such as 
long-term strategies, annual reports and budget guidelines. The extent to which EMR is in 
contact with the director group is mainly through reporting and other organizational contact. 
As the director group provides the main budgetary framework, EMR might be in contact in 
advance, in order to submit proposals for the budget. Otherwise, substantial freedom is 
experienced for the departments and sections regarding their specific field of responsibility. 
The respondents from EMR also experience the ability to make decisions on matters within 
their field, without much interference from NVE’s leadership (Interview 1 NVE, 2016). These 
results exhibit how NVE’s behaviour follows the intra-organizational vertical specialization. 
The internal division between levels in NVE is further based on how the work of NVE’s 
departments is characterized by technicality. Within EMR, daily work assignments are mainly 
technical and field specific. At some instances, they might also work on legal or economic 
matters, but these are mainly small-scale issues. Issues of a more overarching or political sort, 
or matters of broader policies, are lifted to higher levels of the agency (Interviews NVE, 
2016). As such, contact between the lower level employees of EMR and the leadership is 
limited to formal connections of budget control and other formal steering mechanisms. 
Parallels from this might be drawn to OED’s connections with NVE, as chapter 4.1.1 will get 
into in more detail. Following, because of the technicality, most of ERM’s work goes “under 
the radar” of the public media, regardless of the degree of politicization. If issues EMR are 
working on are politically contested, attention in the media is often limited to energy sector 
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business journals21, which are distributed to power market stakeholders, environmental 
movements or other types of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Interviews NVE, 
2016). There is nonetheless one example of when EMR’s work has been subject to attention 
in nation-wide media. The European RE-DISS project22, an initiative for improving the 
tracking of energy resources and functioning as a guarantee-system for the use of renewable 
energy, was subject to annual statements. Since the tracking system is separated from the 
tangible trade of resources, these statements were often subject to misunderstandings, which 
the EMR constantly needed to clarify in public (Interview 3 NVE, 2016). This is one example 
of NVE’s work being subject to politicization. However, through the interviews this example 
appears to be the exception rather than the rule. It is through the interviews also stressed that 
most EU energy regulations have been positive for NVE and Norway, since they allow for 
harmonization of the market and more efficient cross-border distribution and trade. Also, 
when faced with problems, NVE actively works for creating solutions that benefit the 
Norwegian energy sector (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Based on these results, it thus seem as EU 
energy regulations have not been subject to substantial political contestation in Norway. 
4.1.1 Ministerial Steering 
As already mentioned, NVE is formally placed beneath the OED. The agency forms part of 
the OED’s underlying Energy and Water Resources Department (EV), together with 
Statnett 23  and ENOVA 24 . EV formally consist of six sections, of which the OED’s 
management and steering dialogue of NVE forms part of the section for Water Resources and 
Area Planning (see appendix D). 
                                                
21 For instance Montel, which is an information provider that cover the Nordic and European 
electricity and energy markets (Montel, 2012). Or Europower, which is the Nordics leading 
agency for news and analysis on the power industry. The latter evenly distribute the industry 
magazine Energi (Europower, s.a.). 
22 The RE-DISS project was concluded in 2012, the final project report might be accessed 
through http://www.reliable-disclosure.org/. 
23 Statnett is the system operator in the Norwegian energy system, and responsible for 
managing the main power grid (Statnett, s.a.). NVE is supervisor of Statnett, meaning that 
Statnett must operate within the framework and regulations set by NVE (Interviews NVE, 
2016). 
24 ENOVA is a public organization for working towards environmental friendly use and 
production of energy in Norway. Took over the environmental side of NVE’s tasks upon 
establishment in 2001 (Faugli, 2012). 
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According to the OED’s annual document of allocation to NVE (2015b), the steering dialogue 
between OED and NVE consist of regular meeting activity and some main documents. These 
documents are the department’s annual budget proposition, the annual document of 
allocation, instructions for finances and management of NVE, and the annual report from 
NVE. Also, NVE is to contribute to OED’s work with technical assessments and scientific 
reports (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2015b). 
Through the allocation documents, NVE is presented with a range of objectives for their work 
the following year. The documents also contain detailed parameters of how results and 
measures should be presented in the annual report. Regarding European cooperation and 
energy regulation, NVE’s objective for 2014 was to contribute to efficient markets and 
systems for energy. In the following annual report, NVE was to inform about their work with 
EEA relevant legislation that will affect the internal energy market, and subsequently shed 
light on their connection to ACER (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2014). The document from 
2015 goes more into detail, where it is specified that NVE is to ensure an efficient regulation 
and supervision of the power market and actively participate in international collaboration of 
regulators. The report parameter is mainly similar to the previous year, however NVE’s 
connection to CEER was also to be reported (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2015b). The 
newly issued allocation document for 2016 appears less detailed than the previous two years, 
even though this has not been subject to attention within the section (Mail NVE, 2016). For 
2016, NVE is to have a good overview of how the European power system is developing, and 
how that might impact Norway. In the annual report, they are to describe the efforts 
implemented and the results connected to this work, especially focusing on how processes of 
assessing the developments in the Nordic and European energy and power systems are 
strengthened (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2016). 
The actual contact between OED and NVE, as perceived by the interviewed employees of 
NVE, consists mainly of the exchange of technical advice, often based on requests by the 
OED. Such requests might be informal, in that OED might take contact for the purpose of 
technical explanations of certain functions. Or they might take the form of formal requests, as 
with regulation amendment proposals, where NVE functions as an official consultative. For 
instance when faced with proposals for new EU regulations, which OED comments on, NVE 
functions as a consultant regarding the technical aspects of the proposed regulations 
(Interviews NVE, 2016). 
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One instance where contact between OED and NVE is prominent, is through cases of 
complaints to concessions set by NVE. In such instances, OED is the formal appellate. In 
instances of complaint, OED might take contact with specific caseworkers directly for an 
enhanced technical evaluation. However, the head of section is always informed about the 
process and dialogue with the ministry (Interview 3 NVE, 2016). Otherwise, contact with the 
ministry is reported to most often take place through the head of section or the department 
director (Interviews NVE, 2016). This contact regards largely the main documents mentioned 
above. 
The results show little signs of structural duplication between NVE and the ministry. There is 
a formal separation organizationally, and through the interviews it is reported that the division 
between the organizations is clearly defined. Whilst the OED works at a more broader and 
strategic level, NVE’s tasks are detailed and technical. 
One of the interviewees does however report significant degrees of contact between NVE and 
the OED, on certain instances. This contact is mainly based on exchanging information and 
dividing tasks, for instance when preparing for legislation development processes at the EU 
level (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). A specific example is the NC-procedure, where the European 
regulators, via ACER, forms guidelines for the regulation. These are further sent to the 
European network of transmission system operators for energy (ENTSO-E), who drafts 
proposed regulation and sends it back to the regulators and ACER. Then a recommendation 
for the final regulation is sent to the Commission, where OED participates together with 
representatives from the member states. Throughout the process, NVE is active in working on 
the policy field in question. As such, in such procedures the interviewee states that they 
experience an overlapping sector competence and dialogue between OED and NVE 
(Interview 2 NVE, 2016) (see appendix E for detailed portrayal of the procedure). 
4.2 EU Level Energy Regulation 
At the EU level, energy regulation is organized among the Commission and DG Energy, and 
ACER. Energy regulation has a long history in Europe, and a thorough tracing of this lengthy 
process back to its origin is not necessary for the purpose of this project. However, it should 
be mentioned that before the EU actively started to interfere in the energy sector in the 1980s 
and onward the energy sector was largely characterized by separate national electricity 
systems with vertically integrated companies, which participated in a only few bilateral 
collaborations (Jevnaker, 2015). Beyond the 1980s, and with the spurring interest of the EU 
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on energy regulation, the sector has been subject to substantial change. In 1988, the 
Commission issued a working paper on The Internal Energy Market (European Commission, 
1988), where ‘the Commission advocated the creation of an internal energy market. The 
major obstacles to market integration would be the structures and practices of national energy 
markets, which protected the industry from the competition’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 76). 
Following this paper, and according to Mathieu (forthcoming), changes in the electricity 
sector, and thereby also for energy policy in general, might be seen as clearly structured into 
three periods, corresponding with the three EU packages on energy regulation. 
‘The first period corresponds with the first regulatory package, which was applied in the 
1990s until 2002’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 75). The situation then, which was largely 
characterized by national implementation of energy regulation, ‘spurred an acute need for 
both increasing the coordination between member states and that for gathering expertise at the 
EU level’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 75). Several measures were taken, and whilst the 
Commission created the Florence Forum25, the regulators created their own network, and the 
transmission system operators (TSOs) set up their own federation. The second period, from 
2002 to 2009, was characterized by the lacking efficiency of the Florence Forum. This 
ultimately led to the Commission creating ERGEG, an official regulatory network for 
coordination and expertise26 (Mathieu, forthcoming). These two regulatory packages imposed 
substantial organizational reform at the member state level: 
For industry, gradually stricter requirements for horizontal specialization entailed 
growing separation between production and transmission activities (unbundling). For 
government, requirements for vertical specialization meant that regulation would be 
administered by a separate governmental entity (agencification). At the member state 
level, this EU legislation triggered domestic organizational changes of relevance to co-
operation on cross-border networks: Unbundling meant that vertically integrated 
companies were separated into producers and transmission system operators, whereas 
agencification meant that national energy regulators emerged as separate entities from 
sector ministries – the latter thereby increased the distance to the national 
                                                
25 ‘The Electricity Regulatory Forum (Florence Forum) was set up to discuss the creation of 
the internal electricity market. Their main purpose was to solve issues of cross-border 
electricity trade on a voluntary basis is order to integrate national markets. They regularly 
gather once or twice a year (European Commission Energy, 2016; Mathieu, forthcoming). 
26 ERGEG was officially discontinued as of July 1st 2011 (Olje- og energidepartementet, 
2013). 
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government… [Although] many emerging energy regulators maintained close contact 
with sector departments, the relative influence of national governments – whose 
concerns for national sovereignty had limited cross-border co-operation – on 
regulatory overview was reduced as regulators became increasingly independent. By 
changing the constitution of these domestic organizations, incremental changes in EU 
legislation served to reduce resistance to more expansive co-operation on cross-border 
networks’ (Jevnaker, 2015, p. 13) 
Despite several measures taken, and the incorporation of the two regulation packages on 
energy, market integration, cross-border competition, and trade in the energy sector stalled 
throughout the 2000s. Inherent problems regarded the insufficient coordination among 
regulators at the EU level, the lack of independence and powers of the national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs), insufficient coordination between the TSOs and the Commission’s lack 
of resources (Mathieu, forthcoming). By the midst of the 2000s, the lacking realisation of the 
internal energy market spurred a renewed acknowledgement that further measures were 
needed. In 2006, the Commission issued a Green Paper on a new strategic energy policy for 
Europe, with three primary objectives; a competitive energy market, security of supply, and 
climate change (European Commission, 2006). The internal market was perceived as the most 
important mean to meet these primary objectives. Following, the third energy reform package 
was introduced, in which massive competence were shifted in favour of the Commission, and 
the regulator network was transformed into ACER (Mathieu, forthcoming). 
4.2.1 The European Commission and Directorate General for Energy 
Egeberg and his collaborators (2006) were among the first to empirically present how the 
Commission seemingly have enhanced its autonomy at the expense of national governments 
over the years. This capacity has been further enhanced by the incorporation of the third 
energy package, which ‘has involved a massive delegation of regulatory competences to the 
Commission’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 95) For instance, the Commission now holds the 
right to implement network codes27. In addition, the Commission has ‘gained the right to 
                                                
27 Network codes were traditionally elaborated at the national level, but ’the need for EU-
level network codes was identified during the elaboration of the third package. [Mainly] in 
order to create the operational and technical conditions for cross-border exchanges of 
electricity, while pursuing the other policy goals (security of supply, competitive and low 
carbon energy sector)’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 95). 
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intervene in a certain number of cases… For example, the Commission may now require 
NRAs to withdraw any decision that would not comply with the guidelines attached to the 
regulatory framework’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 95). However, these new competences often 
require a lot of technical knowledge and represents a great deal of work for which the 
Commission initially did not have the resources, technical expertise, or knowledge (Mathieu, 
forthcoming). This is one of the reasons why ACER was established, which will be explained 
in the detail in chapter 4.2.2. 
The respondents from NVE report little or no direct or regular contact between NVE and the 
Commission. In instances where NVE has been in contact with the Commission or DG 
Energy, this contact has taken place indirectly through NordREG, ACER or CEER 
(Interviews NVE, 2016). One example where NVE has been in contact with DG Energy is 
when they have presented a report on consumer flexibility, on behalf of a NordREG working 
group (Interview 1 NVE, 2016). In addition, CEER often holds workshops or conferences 
where leaders from the Commission might participate, and NVE has contact with the 
Commission through such events (Interview 3 NVE, 2016). Whilst the Commission is 
experienced as open for input and information, it is reported that NVE rarely takes contact 
with the Commission alone. Greater momentum and legitimacy is experienced through good 
coordination with the “sister-regulators” and through NordREG especially (Interview 1 NVE, 
2016).  
4.2.2 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
ACER was formally established in 2009 as part of the third energy package, and the 
transformation of the network of regulators into an official EU level agency. The reasons 
behind its establishments are largely threefold. First of all, the ‘evaluation of the second 
regulatory package highlighted the need for EU level binding decisions… Hence, the 
Commission wanted to transform the legal status of the regulators’ network so as to enable 
them to make binding decisions’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 100). The only type of 
organization that can make such decisions at the EU level would be an agency. The need for 
the group of regulators to be able to make binding decisions thus triggered the choice for a 
EU agency as an institutional model. Second, the Commission was in need of EU level 
resources and technical expertise to cope with the new competencies of a common European 
energy regulation. A separate agency would thus be a beneficial solution for providing such 
assistance. Lastly, an EU agency model was needed for the purpose of giving the NRAs 
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support in their work, through the functioning of a permanent staff, information, resources 
and so on (Mathieu, forthcoming). 
Following, the directive establishing ACER granted the NRAs increased autonomy and 
responsibilities. When carrying out their tasks through ACER, the regulators ‘should be 
legally distinct and functionally independent from any other public or private entity, act 
independently from any market interests and do not seek or take instructions from any 
government or other public or private entity’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 106). This 
independence is to be preserved through the NRAs ability to make autonomous decisions, 
independently from any political body, to possess separate annual budget allocations, with 
autonomy in the implementation of the allocated budget, and having adequate human and 
financial resources to carry out its duties (Mathieu, forthcoming). The establishment of ACER 
also gave the NRAs a European mandate, by extending their policy area to include the 
objectives of European energy regulation, which as previously mentioned entails the prospect 
of a competitive energy market, security of supply and the environmental challenges. These 
objectives should from now on be encountered at the EU level, through cooperation between 
ACER, the NRAs and the Commission. In addition, the NRAs should work towards 
developing functional regional markets within the EU, eliminating restrictions to energy trade 
between member states, develop cross-border transmission capacities to meet demands, and 
enhance integration of national markets (Mathieu, forthcoming). Evidently, the establishment 
of ACER brought about a significant centralization of regulatory power at the EU level, and a 
clear integration of the European energy sector organizations. 
Currently, the staff of ACER comprises of a permanent staff, in addition to experts seconded 
by the energy NRAs. Regulation is overseen by a Board of Regulators, which comprises of 
senior representatives from the energy NRAs of the 28 EU member states (ACER, s.a.-c). 
ACER also comprises of an Administrative Board and a Board of Appeals, in addition to five 
departments (for organizational structure see appendix F). ACER is responsible for fostering 
cooperation among the European energy regulators, for ensuring market integration and for 
harmonising regulatory frameworks within the EU’s energy policy objectives (ACER, s.a.-a). 
‘Among its various tasks, ACER’s major role is to help the Commission in preparing the 
adoption of implementing regulation. This is done together with the group of TSOs, which 
was also formalized and integrated into the regulatory process’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 75). 
As a EU agency, ACER has the legal competence to issue decisions, which is reported as 
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affecting the work of all member regulators (Interview 2 NVE, 2016), consequently also the 
work of third country regulators as NVE. 
According to Article 31.1 of the directive behind the establishment of ACER: 
The Agency shall be open to the participation of third countries which have concluded 
agreements with the Community whereby they have adopted and are applying 
Community law in the field of energy and, if relevant, in the fields of environment and 
competition (European Commission, 2009). 
 As such, third country regulators might be granted full membership of ACER. However, 
since the third package has not yet been incorporated into EEA and Norwegian law, NVE’s 
current participation in ACER is limited accordingly. Currently, representatives from NVE 
are allowed informal access and to participate in working groups, but not at the highest level 
where decisions are made. The lack of full membership and decision-making authority in 
ACER is perceived as a problem. Technical advice and input might be taken into account, but 
in some instances they might be overlooked since Norway is not an equal member. Following, 
Norwegian national interests might be subject to lower priority than those of the member 
countries (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). The longer it takes to implement the third package, the 
bigger gap between Norway and the other members. Therefore, it is deemed increasingly 
important to influence decisions at an early stage. The respondents do however report that a 
good professional argument is more effective when seeking to influence decisions, and often 
overshadows which country the arguments come from (Interview 1 NVE, 2016). Meaning 
that before the third package is implemented in Norway, it is especially important for NVE to 
be well prepared and come into processes early. For instance when NVE are participating in 
ACER working groups, and especially in the initial phases of new regulation. It is nonetheless 
expected that the third package will in fact be implemented in Norway, which upon 
completion will entail some aspects of law amendment and changes for the energy system and 
power market in Norway (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). 
When the third energy package is incorporated into the EEA framework as expected, NVE 
will gain access to the main decision-making body of ACER, the Board of Regulators. This 
board is, as already mentioned, staffed by senior representatives of the NRAs, in addition to 
one non-voting representative of the Commission (ACER, s.a.-b). According to article 14.5 of 
the regulation behind ACER’s establishment the ‘[…] Board of Regulators shall act 
independently and shall not seek or follow instructions from any government of a Member 
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State, from the Commission, or from another public or private entity’ (European Commission, 
2009). This paragraph represents a legally binding ban of any kind of ministerial instructions 
regarding a national agency’s work in ACER, and subsequently considerably increases their 
autonomy. Also, energy directives implemented in 2009 bans instructions at the national level 
‘when [national agencies are] carrying out the regulatory tasks conferred upon [them] by this 
Directive and related legislation’ (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 
2009a, 2009b; Ruffing, 2015). This ultimately means, that when NVE becomes a full 
participant of ACER through the inclusion of the third package into Norwegian law, their 
autonomy would be severely strengthened and national steering of NVE would, in certain 
instances, be made illegal by European law. Which evidently points toward a centralization of 
administrative power in Europe. 
4.3 Transnational Energy Regulation 
Upon question of which actors NVE in general or EMR specifically has connections with, the 
Nordic and European “sister-regulators” are reported as important collaborators. This contact 
most commonly takes place through NordREG or CEER, in addition to the participation in 
ACER (Interviews NVE, 2016). Through these networks, the regulators work towards 
developing some common principles and strategies for harmonizing the market and 
regulations both in the Nordic and in Europe. In addition, the networks are often used for the 
purpose of exchanging information (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). The focus of the following sub-
chapters is concentrated on NordREG and CEER, and NVE’s participation thereof. 
4.3.1 Forum of Nordic Energy Regulators 
NordREG is a consensus-based cooperation between the Nordic NRAs, formally established 
in 2002. NVE is a complete member, together with the Danish Energy Regulator Authority 
(DERA), the Swedish Energy Market Inspectorate (EI), the Finnish Energy Authority (EV) 
and the Icelandic National Energy Authority (OS). Prior to the formal agreement, the Nordic 
NRAs have participated in bi-annual meetings with a rotating chairmanship since 1999. The 
leaders meet in the NordREG Board, and employees of NVE participate in different working 
groups (Interview 1 NVE, 2016). These working groups are set up according to tasks drafted 
from the annual work program. 
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The work in NordREG has several functions. It is connected to the work of both CEER and 
ACER, as a horizontal linkage that goes through all of NordREG’s projects. On some 
instances, NordREG also functions as a coordinator for the Nordic regulators. ‘The 
cooperation is based on a tradition of consensus and a strong political commitment to 
developing the common Nordic electricity market’ (NordREG, 2016, p. 5). The purpose of 
the network is to create added value to the Nordic electricity market by cooperation, 
information exchange and analysis. As such, the work in NordREG regards: 
[Delivering] statements and reports for harmonization and improvement in the Nordic 
electricity market in view of especially developments and changes in the European 
and EU context and frameworks. The work within NordREG focuses on practical, 
relevant solutions to common challenges, i.e. in relation to the European network 
codes and guidelines (NordREG, 2016, p. 6) 
NVE’s membership is perceived as equal to the other members, and no difference is made 
between the members regardless of differing connections to the EU. Throughout the years 
there has developed a good, consensus-based culture in NordREG and the members actively 
work towards developing common strategies and notes. They also coordinate to develop 
common positions towards the EU, and into EU policy processes. For instance, cooperation in 
NordREG is common when preparing for implementation of new EU policies. Or in order to 
influence a policymaking process at the early stages where the Nordic NRAs have coinciding 
interests. Or especially in order to communicate with one united voice into ACER processes 
(Interview 1 NVE, 2016). Since the implementation of the third energy package is delayed in 
Norway, it is perceived as especially important to have a good platform for cooperation in the 
Nordics. Some of the regulations of the third package will have an impact on regional 
regulation in Norway, and it is therefore essential for NVE to participate in the Nordic 
network in order to influence how this regulatory framework will become (Interview 1 NVE, 
2016). 
The respondents from NVE disagree to a certain extent whether there exists a division of task 
or pooling of resources within NordREG. One emphasises that it is important for NVE to 
have own expertise on the most essential areas, whilst another claims that division of tasks is 
in fact present (Interviews NVE, 2016). Two examples of the latter are advanced through the 
interviews. Firstly, an annual program with long-term goals structures the work in NordREG. 
This program consists of several tasks, which are divided between the different members. For 
2016, NVE is responsible for a project of capacity calculation and for introducing a joint 
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balance settlement between Finland, Sweden and Norway (NordREG, 2016). Whilst this 
division is always consensus-based, it is reported as common that some take responsibility for 
drafting notes and others might participate with technical input. NVE’s employees might have 
special competence on certain topics, and it is thereby deemed natural that they take 
responsibility for drafting something common for all participants. In other instances, one of 
the other regulators might take on the responsibility (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Second, the 
different working groups of NordREG often function through a division of tasks. Sometimes 
one specific person is pointed out as lead drafter, other times several persons might draft 
different sections of the document simultaneously. The division often takes place according to 
competence or interest, or according to what is on the different national agendas. As such, it is 
perceived that tasks are often allocated and divided according to competence and national 
experience (Interview 3 NVE, 2016). 
4.3.2 Council of European Energy Regulators 
Similarly to NordREG, CEER is a transnational network for the cooperation of national 
energy regulators. The network functions as ‘the voice of Europe’s national energy regulators 
at the EU and international level, [and facilitates cooperation, exchanging of information and 
best practices for the purpose of] a single, competitive, efficient and sustainable internal 
market for gas and electricity in Europe’ (CEER, s.a.-a). Whilst NordREG is an organization 
for the Nordic NRAs, CEER is open for all energy regulators in the EU and the EEA. In 
addition, NRAs from EFTA or EU accession countries are welcome to participate as 
observers. Thus, NVE is regarded as an equal member of CEER together with the NRAs from 
all EU member states and Iceland. The regulators from FYR of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Switzerland and Montenegro participate as observers (CEER, s.a.-b). Historically, CEER was 
an informal network for mutual learning, and exchanging information and best practices 
among the national regulators. The collaboration was also meant as a way to develop common 
perspectives on regulation. ‘In March 2000, the NRAs gave their network the status of 
association under Belgian private law and named it the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER)’ (Mathieu, forthcoming, p. 81). Today, CEER complements, but does not 
overlap, the work of ACER (CEER, s.a.-a). 
The main difference between CEER and ACER is that while the former writes reports, 
recommendations and answers to EU hearings, which indirectly might affect decisions or 
regulations, ACER is a EU agency with competence to issue legal binding decisions 
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(Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Another difference is how ACER works on detailed regulation, 
whilst CEER is responsible for more strategic and prospective work (Interview 1 NVE, 2016). 
Through CEER, and to a certain extent also ACER, the respondents from NVE report 
connections with various international actors in addition to the range of European NRAs. For 
instance, contact with various European NGOs or research institutions is reported, often in 
terms of information exchange or professional input (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Through 
CEER, NVE is reported to have contact with the Commission, especially with DG Energy or 
DG Just28. This contact might take different forms, for instance through participation at 
conferences or workshops (Interviews NVE, 2016). 
Regarding division of tasks and pooling of resources, largely the same is reported for CEER29 
as for NordREG. A division of tasks is perceived to exist, however it is always based on 
consensus and all parties involved might participate with input. Some take responsibility for 
drafting the reports and so on (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). One difference is that the process is 
longer and more complex within CEER. In CEER the documents are written in task forces, 
which are formally placed beneath the working groups. A task force comprise of a chosen 
team that issues a document that is sent to the working group for comments. After the 
working group has commented on the draft, it is sent back to the task force for amendment, 
before a final approval in the working groups. Upon approval, the document goes to the 
general assembly, where the leaders of the NRAs accept the document (Interview 3 NVE, 
2016). 
4.4 Processes of Energy Regulation 
When relevant, distinctions have been made between the two phases of a policymaking 
process. Some of the results might also be organized according to this distinction. Thus, the 
following sub-section involves accounts of who NVE connects to or work in collaboration 
with in the down- and upstream processes of policymaking. The following results are based 
on the perceived contact of the interviewed employees of EMR. 
                                                
28 The European Commission Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers 
29 See appendix G for organizational chart of CEER. 
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4.4.1 Downstream Process of European Energy Regulation 
The results demonstrate that NVE’s work, in varying degrees, is affected by EU regulations. 
Whilst it is reported that EEA relevant regulations is highly significant for NVE’s functioning 
over all, lower level sections report little influence in their daily work. This however varies 
depending on the tasks in question. Nevertheless, in many instances Norway already meets 
the demands set by the EU (Interviews NVE, 2016), and it is often the case that NVE does not 
need to make many adjustments in order to face new demands or regulations. One example is 
the Norwegian energy consumer market. On this field, the Norwegian market finds itself way 
ahead of the remaining European countries and Norway is somewhat portrayed as a leading 
nation on this field. Therefore, new regulations stemming from the EU takes sight on solving 
problems which are no longer an issue in Norway, since other countries in Europe have not 
been able to establish a sturdy energy consumer market yet (Interview 3 NVE, 2016). This 
ultimately means that when faced with regulations on this field, they can be implemented 
relatively unhindered, and thus not have a significant impact on NVE’s work. 
Also, the example of the third energy package becomes relevant once more. Since the Nordics 
in general, and Norway especially, already has a well-developed energy and power system, 
many of the demands from the third package have already been met. Even though the package 
has not been formally implemented in Norway, it is expected that this will happen in the near 
future. When the third package is accepted, some changes needs to be made (Interview 2 
NVE, 2016), but they are not likely to make a big impact, since NVE and Norway already 
fulfils many aspects of the third package. Nonetheless, despite these two concrete examples 
NVE reports massive influence of EU regulations in their work in general (Interview 2 NVE, 
2016). Likely due to the close connection Norway has to the EU, the EEA agreement, and 
participation in the internal energy market. 
When faced with new regulation from the EU, it is reported that NVE is in contact with the 
OED for providing information. If the regulations would entail any difficulties or problems, 
NVE is the responsible for finding suitable solutions for the Norwegian energy sector 
(Interview 1 NVE, 2016). There are no reported signs of ministerial steering in the 
implementation processes, and the contact between NVE and OED appears to be mainly 
informational. Hence, it seems as NVE enjoys significant autonomy in the implementation 
process of EU regulations and is entrusted with the responsibility to find suitable solutions. 
This is further connected to how EMR’s tasks entail a high degree of technicality and a low 
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degree of politicization. With this level of trust and technicality, potential issues are solved at 
early stages or are not particularly evident, ultimately reducing the possibility for substantive 
ministerial steering. 
It is however reported an extended contact between NVE and the sister-regulators in other 
countries when preparing for the implementation of new EU legislation. This contact is 
mainly with the other Nordic regulators, through NordREG. To a lesser extent, NVE is also in 
contact with the European regulators and CEER. Tasks connected to implementation are often 
subject to an internal division of tasks within the networks. For instance, regarding new 
regulations on capacity calculation, a NVE employee coordinates the work in NordREG 
(Interview 1 NVE, 2016). 
The respondents appear to disagree on which organizations NVE contacts upon encountering 
problems with implementation or practising of regulations. Whilst one claims that these are 
often discussed in the transnational networks and that it is common that potential problems 
are mutual among the different regulators (Interview 1 NVE, 2016), another reports the quite 
opposite and that national interpretation of legislation are not discussed in the networks 
(Interview 3 NVE, 2016). It might be the case that networks are used for information 
exchange and brainstorming for potential solutions, however the formal implementation into 
national law is deemed as reserved for the national level. On at least one instance, NVE has 
been in direct contact with ACER for a written clarification on a certain regulation. This was 
regarding the REMIT-project, on a specific question regarding conditions for Norway 
(Interview 1 NVE, 2016). 
Different perceptions also characterize the view on whether the EU level organizations seek 
control over how regulations are implemented or practised. One respondent has a clear 
perception of an eagerness to harmonize implementation practices in Europe, whilst another 
reports no control on how NVE practices EU regulations (Interviews NVE, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the regulations are often detailed and contain deadlines for implementation, 
thus limiting the room for national manoeuvring (Interview 1 NVE, 2016). This might be 
interpreted as signs of central steering by some, whilst others might see it differently. On 
certain instances, involvement from other actors has also been experienced. From commercial 
actors or NGOs who have been curious on implementation practices, and questioned how they 
are conducted (Interview 3 NVE, 2016). Also, once regulations has been incorporated into the 
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EEA agreement, as the third package is expected to be (Olje- og energidepartementet, s.a.), 
regulations become subject to control by the EFTA30 Surveillance Authority (ESA). ESA is 
responsible for ensuring that Norway follows the regulations that have been implemented. If 
ESA discovers a breach they contact the OED, since OED is the formally responsible to adopt 
legislation (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Together, these results exhibit signs of compound 
connections that NVE might be subject to when dealing within the downstream process of EU 
energy regulation. 
4.4.2 Upstream Process of European Energy Regulation 
Regarding the developmental process of policymaking, the example with the energy 
consumer market once again becomes relevant. Since Norway might be regarded as a pioneer 
at this field, it makes the Commission and other European actors more responsive to hearing 
how NVE has worked in order to develop this well-functioning market. Even though there 
have not been any formal requests, civil servants from EU institutions involved in such work 
might request information at for instance conferences or meetings. They might also ask for 
documents regarding how these processes have been conducted in the Nordics (Interview 3 
NVE, 2016). This demonstrates that whilst Norway might be excluded from certain formal 
arenas of decision-making, informal exchange of information might be equally relevant. It 
also demonstrates that the European decision-making actors are open for information on 
questions where NVE and Norway are especially competent or experienced. Showing that 
these elements, on certain issues, matters more than formal affiliation. 
In addition, NVE coordinates closely and is tightly integrated with the other Nordic regulators 
through NordREG in the developmental phase. What makes sense for NVE as the Norwegian 
regulator is often subject to an overlapping interest from the other Nordic regulators. As such, 
the cooperation in NordREG functions as a way for the regulators to establish a common 
position, and to speak with one voice into for instance decision-making processes in ACER. It 
is experienced that the possibility to influence decisions are greatest in the early stages of a 
process, and when the Nordic regulators have established a united position. The respondents 
also report a perception of being stronger in developmental phases when they unite at a 
common position, which is essential since approved decisions are increasingly difficult to 
amend (Interviews NVE, 2016). It seems evident that NVE works actively into policymaking 
                                                
30 The European Free Trade Association 
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processes, especially when there are prospects of EEA relevant legislation. However, NVE’s 
work regarding new legislation varies, since there are different types of legislation. In the case 
of new directives, which the Commission decides on, Norway needs to be in contact with the 
member states of the EU in order to influence (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Such contact might 
occur through for instance mechanisms of surrogate representation, where Norway might seek 
to influence representatives from other countries to advocate for Norwegian interests 
(Fossum, 2014). Also, in these processes, CEER and ACER issue consultations that the 
Commission might take into account (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). Following, NVE might seek 
to influence the processes by participating in working groups or tasks forces in NordREG or 
CEER. However, NVE’s possibilities as an outsider seem somewhat limited, since the arenas 
for decision-making are several links away. 
In lower level policymaking processes on the other hand NVE is reported to play a bigger 
role. For instance in terms of establishing network codes. Employees of NVE actively 
participate in working groups and task forces, where they work on regulations at a detailed 
level. These processes are however subject to mainly informal influence by NVE, since they 
are not formally affiliated (Interview 2 NVE, 2016). 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has contained descriptive accounts and presentations of the results gathered in 
this project. The purpose has been to shed light on the relevant organizational features of the 
organizations involved, and to examine what connections NVE has to these different 
organizations. The chapter has aimed at elucidating how and why such connection might 
occur, and which collaborators that are the most central in the different phases of 
policymaking. 
NVE is largely perceived as an autonomous, professional agency, and the results show signs 
of behaviour following a structural vertical specialization, through how contact within NVE is 
mainly characterized by information exchange and formal steering mechanisms by the 
leadership. Similar characteristics might also be found in the connections between NVE and 
the OED. Tasks are also characterized by a high degree of technicality and a low degree of 
politicization. 
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The findings perceive the Nordic and European sister-regulators as NVE’s most important 
connections, where contact takes place through the transnational networks NordREG or 
CEER. Through these networks, NVE also experience indirect contact with the Commission 
and DG Energy. Outside these networks, direct contact with the Commission is through the 
findings reported as little. NVE also participates in ACER, but are not reckoned as an equal 
member since the inclusion of the third package has stalled in Norway. When the third 
package is implemented, and NVE becomes a complete member of ACER, their autonomy 
versus the department will potentially increase significantly. 
Through NordREG, and to a lesser extent also through CEER, NVE actively participates in 
both implementation and development phases of EU policymaking. In the implementation 
phase mainly for the purpose of mutual assistance and exchanging information, and in the 
developmental phase in order to influence decisions. A certain extent of task division and 
pooling of resources is also present within the networks. The results will be analysed in 
connection to the theoretical assumptions in the following chapter, where they present an 
opportunity to accept or dismiss the expected findings from chapter 2. 
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5 Analysis 
The content of the following chapter focuses on analysing the results from the previous 
chapter in relation to the theoretical assumptions and expected findings from chapter 2. The 
analysis follows the set-up of the theoretical chapter to a large extent. The theoretical 
framework in this project has been twofold, by merging multilevel administration with 
elements of organizational theory. Both theoretical perspectives were subject to the deduction 
of a series of expected findings, presented in the summarizing tables 2.1 and 2.2. In this 
chapter these expected findings resurface, as the purpose is to confirm or disprove their 
existence on basis of the results. 
Whilst some of the results prove to be precisely in line with the theoretically expected, other 
results demonstrate the opposite or lack of findings. Somewhat surprisingly there seems to be 
little contact between NVE and the Commission, DG Energy or ACER, despite the high 
degree of supranational capacity, the lack of ministerial duplication and politicization, and the 
horizontal specialization of the involved actors. Contact between NVE and the EU level 
actors might however be hindered by the somewhat unexpected active contact between NVE 
and the ministry. Also, NVE’s contact with ACER is particularly hindered by the stagnated 
inclusion of the third energy package in Norway. Less surprisingly is the substantial activity 
between NVE and its sister regulators through NordREG and CEER. The results seem to 
demonstrate that these are perhaps NVE’s most important connections. Both in the 
formulation and implementation phases of regulation, the networks appear as NVE’s most 
important arenas for cooperation. 
The chapter follows by first analysing the results in relation to the expected findings of MLA. 
Second, the results and assumption of the variables of organization theory are elucidated one 
at the time. The analysis and results are further summarized in tables, which follows each sub-
chapter. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the potential consequences of the results. 
5.1 Multilevel Administration 
MLA as a theoretical framework provides assumptions for how national agencies, as NVE, 
under certain conditions tends to by-pass their ministries and in varying degrees connect to a 
multitude of organizations in what is deemed the European administrative space (Trondal & 
Peters, 2013). Previous research has provided a backdrop from which we have expected NVE 
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to participate in compound European MLA structures, where the agency ties connections to 
several different collaborators more or less simultaneously (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). 
Based on MLA as a theoretical perspective, and findings from previous research, chapter 2 
presented a theoretical research model of NVE and its potentially most important 
collaborators. With NVE as the focal point, it is interesting to examine the connections NVE 
might have to its national ministry, the OED. NVE could also have connections to the EU 
level, directly to the Commission and DG Energy, or more indirectly through ACER. NVE’s 
sister-regulators in the other Nordic and European countries might be important connections, 
most possibly through the transnational networks NordREG and CEER. The connections with 
these different collaborators might be co-existing, activated at various points of a policy 
process, or function more or less simultaneously (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). The purpose of 
the following is to examine the results of each of these connections in relation to the 
theoretical assumptions, before they are summarized in a table 5.1. 
5.1.1 NVE’s Participation in Multilevel Energy Regulation 
First, as a national agency, NVE is naturally connected to the OED. It is however expected 
that the steering dialogue takes place mainly through formal mechanisms, and that NVE 
might experience a significant degree of autonomy in their daily work. This autonomy is 
founded on the technicality of energy regulation, in addition to the autonomy granted to NVE 
through the Energy Act. The empirics demonstrate that NVE is perceived as a relatively 
autonomous professional agency. Official documents portray how the formal connection 
between NVE and the OED consists mainly of some regular meeting activity and documents. 
For instance, the ministry issues an annual budget proposition for NVE, an annual letter of 
allocation, and instructions for finances and management. NVE respond to these steering 
mechanisms through the annual report.  
From the theoretical framework it is also expected some contact or dialogue between NVE 
and the OED regarding proposals for or implementation of new EU energy regulations. This 
assumption is somewhat confirmed through the results, since another formal steering 
mechanism is the allocated role of NVE to contribute to OED’s work with technical 
assessments and scientific reports. In addition, the actual contact between NVE and OED, as 
perceived by the interviewed employees, mainly consists of NVE providing technical advice 
to the OED upon request. The ministry might request clarifications on certain technical 
matters, and NVE is also used as a formal consultative for the technical aspects of proposed 
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EU regulations. If the new regulations entail any concerns for the OED, NVE is the 
responsible for finding suitable solutions. However, in processes of the actual practising of 
EU regulations, there are no reported signs of ministerial steering. It thus seems as the 
connection between NVE and OED is mainly informational, and that NVE enjoys significant 
autonomy in the actual practising of regulations. 
Second, the theory provides assumptions of connections between NVE and EU level 
organizations. Regarding energy regulation, the relevant institutions are the Commission and 
DG Energy, in addition to ACER. The results show no direct contact between NVE and the 
Commission or DG Energy. However, it is reported an indirect connection with the EU 
administration through ACER or the transnational networks. 
The theoretical assumption further expects NVE to be active in the formulation phase of EU 
energy regulations, in particular regarding regulations with potential EEA relevance. 
Empirically, NVE is reported as being substantially active in the formulation phase of new 
regulation, however this activity mainly takes place through NordREG or CEER. While it is 
experienced that the Commission is open for information or inputs, greater legitimacy and 
momentum is experienced through coordination with the Nordic and European regulators. In 
the implementation phase as well, it is thought that EU regulations substantially affects 
NVE’s work. Regarding implementation, it is also expected that EU level actors push for 
uniform practicing of the regulations, and therefore exerts a certain extent of control over the 
national regulators. It is also considered that ACER might be a point of contact, especially in 
instances of uncertainty regarding the practising of regulations. 
The results demonstrate that NVE’s work, in varying degrees is affected by EU regulations. 
Whilst it is reported that EU regulations is important for NVE’s functioning over all, many 
regulations have little impact on their daily work. The reason for this is that Norway has, on 
many instances, the most well established power and energy system in the entire Europe. 
Thus, many of the EU energy regulations have no effect on Norwegian regulations, since they 
take sight on solving problems that are no longer an issue in Norway. EU regulations on 
energy are sometimes even based on the Norwegian energy market as an ideal type. Broadly 
speaking however, it is reported that the EU influences NVE’s work. Particularly since the 
EU countries are Norway’s most important partners in energy trade and the like. Whether the 
EU actors seek any control regarding the practising of regulations, is subject to disagreement 
in the findings. We are thus not able to make any justified claims about such potential events. 
One instance of contact directly with ACER is reported, when faced with a need for 
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clarification regarding the interpretation of a specific piece of regulation. This however seems 
to be an exception rather than a rule.  
Third, results from previous research leads us to expect that NVE actively connects with 
sister-regulators from particularly the other Nordic and European countries, most often 
through transnational networks. It is expected that these connections function for the purpose 
of information or “best-practice” exchange, and for assisting each other in both the down- and 
upstream phases of policymaking. Through the interviews, the Nordic and European energy 
regulators are in fact reported as NVE’s most important collaborators, and contact with these 
mainly takes place through NordREG and CEER. Through these networks the regulators 
exchange information, and develop common positions and strategies for harmonizing the 
energy market and regulations in the Nordics and in Europe. According to theory, in the 
implementation phase of regulations, the networks might be used in order for the different 
national regulators to assist each other. In particular if the EU level actors are pushing for 
uniform implementation. In the formulation phase, it is likely that the different regulators 
cooperate for the purpose of obtaining information and to unite for the purpose of increased 
possibility for affecting EU level policymaking. As a formal outsider in certain arenas, it may 
be especially important for NVE to be able to ally with the other regulators for increased 
potential for affecting decisions. The results demonstrate that NVE actively cooperates in 
both NordREG and CEER in both phases of a policy process. However, the Nordic 
connections appear as the most important and relevant. In NordREG, the regulators 
coordinate to develop a common position towards the EU, and EU policy processes. For 
instance, cooperation in NordREG is common when preparing for implementation of new EU 
policies. There is however some disagreement among the respondents on the use of mutual 
assistance when faced with problems regarding new regulations. Substantial coordination is 
also reported in the formulation phase of policymaking, especially when the Nordics often 
have coinciding interests. As such, they work towards influencing policymaking processes at 
an early stage, particularly into ACER. Since the implementation of the third package delays 
in Norway, it is perceived as especially essential for NVE to have good connections and 
cooperation with the other Nordic regulators, if they are to have any influence on how the 
regulatory framework will become. 
Lastly, even though the different connections have been dealt with separately, the main 
assumption behind the theoretical model is however that all these different actors and sources 
of influence might be at work more or less simultaneously. Thus, making NVE part of a 
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compound European administrative system for energy regulation, subject to multiple sources 
of influence and compound steering. If NVE is part of a European energy-regulatory MLA, 
and consequently “double-“ or “multi-hatted”, signs of both formal and informal connections 
with multiple collaborators should be present in both policy phases of policymaking. 
The results demonstrated that NVE is connected to the OED through formal steering 
mechanisms, but also for the purpose of providing technical and professional advice and 
information. They also assist OED when faced with new EU regulation. There is however 
reported no direct contact between NVE and the Commission or DG Energy. Nonetheless, 
NVE is to indirectly in contact with the Commission’s administration through ACER, 
NordREG and CEER. NVE’s perhaps most important and influential connections are the ones 
with the sister regulators from the other Nordic and European countries, through NordREG 
and CEER. In the implementation phase of regulations the respondents from NVE report 
contact with the OED, in addition to the sister regulators through the transnational networks. 
In the formulation phase, NVE works actively in NordREG, CEER and ACER, for the 
purpose of influencing decisions. These different connections are activated at different points 
and by various external circumstances. It thus appear that NVE, when dealing with European 
energy regulation, are to a certain extent “multi-hatted” (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). 
5.1.2 Summary of Findings 
To summarize, table 5.1 puts the empirical findings in connection with the theoretical 
assumption.  “++” indicates correlation between the expected and the actual findings. “+” 
indicates a certain extent of correlation, whilst “-“ indicates that there have not been any 
findings to support the expected assumption. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of expected and actual findings for MLA. 
NVE’s relations Expected findings Findings 
To the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy 
(OED) 
1. OED has some degrees of formal control over 
NVE, especially with regards to budget, 
evaluation etc. 
2. NVE has a certain extent of autonomy on energy 
regulation, due to the technicality of the matter 
and their authority through the Energy Act. 
3. There is a certain dialogue between OED and 
NVE regarding the practicing of EU regulations. 
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
 
+ 
To the Commission’s 
administration 
4. NVE is active in the formulation phase of 
European energy regulation, especially if there are 
prospects of EEA relevance. 
5. Energy regulations with EEA relevance affect 
NVE’s regulatory work, especially in the 
implementation phases of policies. 
6. The EU administration supervises domestic 
implementation practices. 
7. There exists dialogue between NVE and ACER 
regarding implementation and practicing of EU 
regulations, especially in instances of uncertainty. 
++ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
- 
 
- 
To “sister”-regulators 
through NordREG and 
CEER 
8. Frequent dialogue and contact for mutual assist, 
and exchange of information and “best-practices” 
9. Cooperation regarding implementation of EU 
regulations. Especially if EU organizations are 
pushing for uniform implementation. 
10. Cooperation and exchanging information and 
“allying” to seek common influence in the 
formulation phase of energy regulation. 
++ 
 
+ 
 
 
++ 
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NVE’s relations Expected findings Findings 
To multiple actors 11. NVE has both formal and informal connections 
with multiple institutions and actors in the field of 
energy regulation 
12. NVE cooperates and seeks assistance with a 
multitude of actors in the implementation phase of 
energy regulation. 
13. NVE is actively cooperating with multiple actors 
in order to influence common energy regulation in 
the formulation phase. 
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
5.2 Organizational Theory 
How an institution is organized is often thought to influence its behaviour. Consequently then, 
organizational features might be manipulated or deliberately designed in order to achieve 
desired outcomes (Egeberg, 2012; Trondal, 2015b). For the purpose of understanding NVE’s 
participation in MLA and potential variations thereof, it is beneficial to examine some of the 
organizational features that NVE and the other relevant organizations possess. Five 
organizational features have been used as independent variables in this project. Below, the 
results for each of these variables are coupled with the theoretically funded expectations. 
The first variable concerns the vertical specialization of NVE. Vertical specialization is 
thought to affect the degree to which NVE is connected to the OED, but also to the other 
organizations. According to theory and previous research NVE’s behaviour is expected to 
follow a vertical specialization, both within the agency and between the agency and the OED. 
Thus, vertical contact in NVE is expected to be limited, and take place mainly through formal 
steering mechanisms, such as budget, evaluation and the like. Contact between NVE and the 
OED is expected to have similar characteristics, and take place through NVE’s leadership. 
Lower level employees are expected to have little, or no, contact with the OED, mainly due to 
the technicality of their tasks and field autonomy. Lower level employees are also expected to 
be less politically steered, and therefore less sensitive to signals from the department 
(Trondal, 2011). OED’s steering dialogue is further expected to be formal, in terms of budget, 
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evaluations and the like. Lastly, the vertical organization of NVE is expected to open up for 
potential connections between NVE and other European actors of energy regulation. 
Empirically, these expectations are subject to mixed validation. The extent to which the 
employees of the EMR are in contact with the leadership is mainly through reporting, budget 
proposal and other organizational contact. Otherwise, the lower level sectors of NVE 
experience significant autonomy in their daily duties, and the ability to make decisions 
without interference from the leadership structure. This is caused mainly by the technicality 
and sector specific tasks, and demonstrates how NVE’s behaviour follows the intra-
organizational vertical specialization of the agency. Similarly, the contact between NVE and 
the OED is also characterized by formal steering mechanisms and budget control. However, 
NVE also holds the role of providing the OED with assistance and advice, and consult the 
ministry on relevant policy processes. Thus, the connection between NVE and OED seems to 
be more than merely a top-down steering process, but also an instance of information 
exchange. It is nonetheless reported that contact between the two institutions takes place 
mainly through NVE’s leadership. Except on instances of complaint to NVE’s concessions, 
where OED is the formal appellate and might approach specific caseworkers directly.  
Though the results portray an expected behaviour following an intra-vertically specialized 
NVE, the expected behaviour from inter-vertical specialization appears less clear. Despite 
inter-vertical specialization, NVE seems to have active contact with the OED, which not 
surprisingly affects the degree to which NVE connects to other collaborators. We have seen 
how NVE appears to have a high degree of connection with its sister agencies through the 
transnational networks, however results for NVE’s connection to the supranational 
organizations are lacking compared to the expected. This might be due to how contact 
between the agency and the department appears to be more active than expected. This active 
contact might limit the contact NVE has to other organizations, especially those of 
supranational character. 
Secondly, the existence of energy regulatory MLA is dependent upon an adequate capacity of 
the Commission, DG Energy and ACER, which are the energy regulatory organizations at the 
supranational level. The energy sector is often portrayed as a sector where the EU level has 
significant capacity and competences. It is thus expected that we will see clear signs of 
connections between NVE and these organizations. 
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Empirically, there is little doubt of the capacity of the EU level actors. However, there are no 
reported signs of direct contact between NVE and the Commission or DG Energy. NVE is 
affected by EU regulation, but there is not experienced any signs of steering by the EU level 
actors regarding the practising of EU regulations. The respondents report some contact with 
ACER, however this connection is largely hindered by the stagnated inclusion of the third 
energy package in Norway. Thus, potential contact between NVE and the supranational 
institutions seems staggered by other structural features, and is limited to mainly indirect 
contact through for instance the transnational networks. 
Third, existence of organizational duplication between NVE and the OED is thought to 
increase the connection there between. Following, lack of duplication is likely to have the 
opposite effect. Lack of duplication might also provide a foundation for more direct contact 
between NVE and the EU level actors, or the sister-regulators through the transnational 
networks. 
There are no clear findings of structural duplication between the ministry and the agency. It is 
however reported a certain extent of contact between the two on processes regarding EU 
regulations, in terms of exchanging information and technical assistance. Nonetheless, the 
tasks and responsibilities of the two are reported as divided and clearly defined. This lack of 
duplication seems to have increased NVE’s possibility for connection with its sister-
regulators through NordREG and CEER. However, and as already mentioned, direct contact 
between NVE and EU level organizations appear less prominent than expected. This is the 
case even despite the lack of ministerial duplication. 
Fourth, the sectorial specialization of energy regulation, the sectorial organization of NVE 
and the Commission, and the existence of sector-specific networks are likely to invoke cross-
border connections on energy regulation between employees of all these institutions. It is 
likely that this type of horizontal specialization increases the possibilities of mutual assistance 
and influence between organizations. 
The results show that NVE’s employees are in active contact with civil servants with similar 
portfolios in the other Nordic and European countries. Through NordREG and CEER, NVE’s 
employees actively cooperate for mutual assistance and exchanging information in the 
implementation phase of EU regulations. The formulation phase as well, is characterized by a 
high degree of activity and contact, mainly for the purpose of influencing decisions at the EU 
level. Connection with actors at the EU level does however appear less prominent, despite 
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sectorial specialization. Regarding ACER, this is most likely due to the awaiting inclusion of 
the third package. 
In addition, horizontal specialization is thought to provide fertile grounds for pooling 
administrative resources between organizations. We might expect to find that NVE pools 
resources and divides tasks with its collaborators on issues of European energy regulation. 
From the interviews, several examples of task division in both the NordREG and CEER 
working groups and task forces are advanced. The tasks are often allocated according to 
competence and national experience. The transnational networks are also actively used for 
exchanging information and mutual assistance. 
Lastly, through theory we make assumption of how energy regulation is likely to be subject to 
a high degree of politicization in Norway. Consequently, this is thought to evoke substantial 
ministerial steering in the implementation phase of EU energy regulation. In the formulation 
phase however, the politicization is likely to be less evident. Thus ministerial steering in this 
phase is likely to be less prominent. 
The results demonstrate that NVE’s work is not subject to any significant degree of 
politicization, neither in the implementation nor the formulation phase. Regulations are often 
so technical that they “go under the radar” of the media, or they are most often positive for the 
Norwegian energy market. Thus not subject to any substantial contestation, and consequently 
preserving NVE’s autonomy. 
5.2.1 Summary of Findings 
The expected and the actual findings from the five organizational variables are summarized in 
table 5.2 below. “++” indicates correlation between the expected and the actual findings. “+” 
indicates a certain extent of correlation, whilst “-“ indicates that there have not been any 
findings to support the expected assumption. 
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Table 5.2 Summary of expected and actual findings for the organizational variables. 
Organizational 
variable 
Expected findings Findings 
Vertical 
specialization 
14. Contact between NVE and OED takes place mainly 
through NVE’s leadership. 
15. OED’s control and steering of NVE is conducted mainly 
through budget control, evaluations and other formal 
steering mechanisms. 
16. Lower level civil servants of NVE experience little or no 
influence or contact with OED. 
17. The vertical organization of NVE opens up for 
connections between the agency and other actors. 
18. Vertical contact within NVE is limited, and mostly takes 
place through formal steering mechanisms such as budget 
and evaluations. 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
++ 
Supranational 
capacity 
19. Clear signs of connections between NVE and actors at the 
supranational level. 
- 
Organizational 
duplication 
20. Duplication between NVE and OED is expected to 
increase the departmental control, and to make NVE’s 
civil servants more apt to departmental steering with 
regards to energy regulation. 
21. Lack of duplication between NVE and OED is expected to 
reduce departmental steering, and provide foundations for 
more direct contact between NVE and the Commission’s 
administration or the “sister”-regulators. 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
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Organizational 
variable 
Expected findings Findings 
Horizontal 
specialization 
22. Sectorial specialization provides foundations for 
cooperation between employees who work on energy 
regulation in NVE, at the supranational level, and in 
“sister-agencies” or transnational networks, both in the 
implementation and the formulation phase of energy 
regulation. 
23. NVE is expected to pool administrative resources with its 
collaborators, especially through the transnational 
networks. This pooling of resources takes place through, 
1) exchanging information etc., 2) dividing tasks within 
the network. 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
++ 
Degree of 
politicization 
24. Due to degree of politicization we might expect 
substantial ministerial steering in the implementation 
phase of EU regulations. 
25. Politicization is likely less evident in the formulation 
phase, and we might therefore expect NVE to be more 
autonomous in this phase of energy regulation. 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
5.3 Consequences 
Three purposes for this project were advocated initially, taking sight on elucidating NVE’s 
participation in multilevel administrative structures, examining why it and potential variations 
of it might occur, in addition to discussing potential consequences. So far, the former two 
have been in focus, particularly in the above analysis of the collected results. Merely 
analysing the results in relation to the theoretical assumptions is however of limited use, if not 
to consider what the results entail in terms of consequences for centralization, coordination, 
and accountability.  
First of all, the existence of MLA is thought to entail a centralization of executive power at 
the EU level, or with certain EU level organizations as the hub (Trondal, 2010). This thought 
is based on the basic assumptions of MLA, of how increasingly autonomous domestic 
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agencies are re-coupled by increasingly strong supranational organizations (Egeberg, 2006; 
Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). The findings of this project report no direct contact between NVE 
and the Commission’s administration. Not to say that direct contact does not exist, only that 
the findings provide no foundation for making any justified claims about this possible 
connection. Nevertheless, regarding centralization of energy regulatory power, the most 
interesting supranational organization is perhaps ACER, as the very establishment of the 
agency was based on a prospect of centralizing regulatory powers. Through ACER, the 
European regulators were joined together and enabled to make binding decisions (Mathieu, 
forthcoming). 
As already mentioned, NVE’s participation in ACER is limited due to the stagnated inclusion 
of the third energy package in Norway. Inclusion of the regulatory package, and thus 
membership in the main decision-making body of ACER, is according to the respondents 
expected to be on the brink of conclusion. When NVE becomes a full member of all arenas in 
ACER, their autonomy is likely to be severely strengthened, on the cost of national steering. 
This is due to how NVE, when working on ACER tasks and the like, is banned from taking 
any kind of ministerial instructions. Especially in the Board of Regulators, where they are to 
act independently as one unit, and not take instructions from any government, EU 
organization, or other public or private unit (European Commission, 2009; Ruffing, 2015). 
Thus, once becoming a member of ACER and when working on related tasks, NVE will be 
located somewhat beyond national control. Pointing towards a centralization of regulatory 
authority at the EU level, with ACER as the hub. 
Previous research has in fact shown that the formal inclusion of domestic agencies in EU 
policymaking seems to enhance their “double-hattedness”, or even “multi-hattedness”. Thus 
splitting their loyalties between national and EU authorities, in both phases of EU policy 
processes (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg, Martens, & Trondal, 2012; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; 
Jevnaker, 2015). Regarding the implementation phase of policy, the energy directives 
implemented in 2009 increases national agencies’ autonomy significantly as they ban national 
level instructions when the agencies are carrying out regulatory tasks conferred to them by 
these directives or related legislation (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 
2009a, 2009b; Ruffing, 2015). Thus, when NVE practices regulations at the national level, 
which stems from these directives or the related legislation, they do so with significant de jure 
autonomy. This formal autonomy, as previous research has shown, is though to be reflected in 
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an agency’s de facto autonomy (Bach & Ruffing, 2013). Thus the more involved in European 
regulation, the more autonomous NVE is expected to be from national steering. 
As a relatively independent organization, ACER has the competence to issue legally binding 
decisions on certain aspects. Full membership in the ACER Board of Regulators will thus 
increase NVE’s decision-making authority significantly. Following what Bach et.al (2015) 
refer to as the differentiation hypothesis, where the differentiated nature of policy making has 
led to a transferring of policy development responsibility to the supranational level, whilst 
implementation remains a national level responsibility. Creating national agencies that are 
actively incorporated into supranational policy formulation, whilst separated from their 
ministerial department. This upstream activity is not only NVE’s contact with ACER, but also 
for their participation in the transnational networks. The agency participation in European 
networks is considered to strengthen ‘national agencies’ position in national policymaking, 
that is, their policy-development authority, rather than their autonomy in policy 
implementation’ (Bach et al., 2015, p. 286). Based on research by Bach et.al, similar results 
are expected for other semi-autonomous agencies that are involved in transnational 
policymaking. NVE is reported to actively participate in the transnational networks, which 
might be interpreted as signs of autonomy and also source for potential increasing autonomy 
in the formulation phase of policy. Ultimately portraying how regulatory power is 
increasingly centralized around supranational or transnational hubs of cooperation. 
Many of the above arguments are based on assumptions of how NVE’s autonomy will 
increase following the inclusion of the third energy package. One should however be careful 
about making conclusions about what is only likely to come. Tracing the agency autonomy of 
NVE through the incorporation of the third package would however be an interesting task for 
future research, as will be discussed further in chapter 6.3. 
Whilst centralizing administrative tasks and executive power to the supranational level 
ensures uniformity and policy harmonization, it is subsequently also on collision course with 
traditional perspectives on national steering. Leading to what Egeberg and Trondal (2015) 
refers to as the coordination dilemma of governance. This dilemma involves how strong 
national coordination and active supranational participation cannot co-exist. It is perceived as 
impossible to have a parallel existence of both the intergovernmental model and the 
supranational model of governance. 
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Traditionally, the EU has been known for relatively weak coordination across levels, which 
has been compatible with strong national coordination. Regulations and directives have been 
decided at the supranational level, whilst the actual implementation and practising have been 
the responsibility of the national level. This has often led to differentiated practising of 
legislation across countries (Egeberg & Trondal, 2015), since implementation through 
national authorities seem to be subject to influence by both national politics and 
administrative traditions (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Knill, 2001; Olsen, 
2007). Different practices across countries ultimately resulted in a desire for stronger 
supranational coordination to ensure more uniform implementation of the EU regulations. In 
order to harmonize implementation practices, a development from “indirect administration” to 
more “direct administration” took place. In the sense that national agencies would work more 
closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member 
states regarding implementation, and consequently by-passing national ministries (Egeberg & 
Trondal, 2009, 2015). 
The findings do not show a strictly supranational nor intergovernmental model of NVE’s 
regulatory activity. The results rather demonstrate that NVE is active in the transnational 
networks, no reported direct contact with EU level actors, and somewhat active contact with 
the OED through formal steering and also through exchanging of advice and information. But 
as argued by Egeberg and Trondal (2015), these may not co-exist and coordination across 
levels is dependent upon poor national coordination and vice versa. Consequently then, the 
results either demonstrate the existence of a coordination dilemma on energy regulation, or a 
hybrid solution that is portrayed as the solution in a complex organizational environment. The 
hybrid solution refers to a compromise between both models of governance, where 
governments might coordinate and control regulatory agencies, whilst implementation 
structure remains based on sectorial specialization (Egeberg & Trondal, 2015). Implementing 
the third package might then rattle the current balance, since it is likely to increase autonomy 
for NVE, and increasingly centralize regulatory power. 
Issues of centralization and coordination lead us to what is perhaps the most important 
consequence of potential multilevel European energy regulation, namely the question of 
accountability. Previous research has advocated how ‘the rise of the European administrative 
system is assumed to profoundly rebalance existing decision-making and accountability 
practices, refocusing adherence to organizational goals, shifting institutional powers, and 
ultimately transforming public policy’ (Bauer & Trondal, 2015a, p. 9). As advocated by Bach 
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et.al, the differentiation hypothesis is likely to affect accountability in terms of decision-
making power:  
The increase of autonomy in policy development fundamentally changes the role of 
agencies as they gain policy-developmental powers that exceed their strict executive 
authority. They become policy-developing actors that shape national policies without 
being directly steered by their national political principals (Bach et al., 2015, p. 301). 
Also regarding implementation, the issue of accountability might be questioned. Many of the 
regulations NVE works on are reported as technical to the degree that they go “under the 
radar” of both the ministry and the public. When decisions are made outside politically 
elected officials, and practiced without attention, a problem arises as to who might be held 
responsible for these decisions. Thus, the continuously increasing amount of semiautonomous 
agencies at arm’s length from the elected politicians has been thought lead to a fragmentation 
of the administrative system, which goes hand in hand with problems of political control and 
accountability (Bach et al., 2015).  
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6 Conclusion 
Evolving international environments and administrative systems are changing circumstances 
for governance, and the energy sector is significantly affected. This project has thus set fore at 
examining the Norwegian energy regulator’s role in increasingly complex multilevel 
administrative structures. The following research questions were advanced: 
How and to what extent does NVE participate in a compound model of multilevel European 
energy regulation? Second, what might explain such participation? Last, what consequences 
could participation potentially entail? 
Founded on assumptions from MLA and organizational theory, empirics were collected 
through analysing documents and conducting interviews, which have been subject to analysis. 
This final chapter concludes the project, by highlighting some of the main findings and 
pointing out some lines ahead. 
6.1 Multilevel Energy Regulation 
Founded on theoretical assumptions from MLA, this project set eye on examining the 
multilevel administrative structures of European energy regulation with NVE as the locus 
point. Based on the research questions, the project aimed at examining NVE’s vertical 
connections to the Commission and DG Energy, ACER and to the OED, and horizontal 
connections to NordREG and CEER. An analytical model was presented, through which it 
was expected that NVE had active connections to the above-mentioned collaborators 
simultaneously or in varying degrees according to specific circumstances. 
The results demonstrated a rather active connection between NVE and the OED through 
exchanging information and providing technical advice, and also through formal steering 
mechanisms. Internationally, the contact with the sister regulators through particularly 
NordREG, but also CEER, appear as the most important. Contact with ACER appears limited 
due to structural circumstances, and no direct contact with the Commission or DG Energy is 
reported. Contact with the supranational organizations might however take place indirectly 
through the networks or ACER. Significant activity in both phases of EU regulation was 
reported in the interviews, underlining that indirect contact with the EU level organizations 
might be present. When the analytical model is updated with weighted lines according to the 
collected results and observations, the framework might be perceived as the following: 
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Figure 6.1 NVE’s actual connections in a compound model of multilevel European 
energy regulation.  
The OED, and the Nordic regulators and NordREG, appear to be the closest connected to 
NVE, followed by the other European regulators and CEER. Thus, national borders between 
NVE and the sister regulators appear less significant. Following, domestic executive and 
administrative systems for energy regulation cannot be deemed as closed-of systems and NVE 
cannot be thought of as a “single-hatted” domestic agency. The results thus refute that 
European energy regulation can follow an intergovernmental model, as the first generation of 
studies on executive orders assumed (Trondal, 2010). ACER and the Commission appear to 
be less connected to NVE, mainly due to certain structural and organizational features. The 
supranational model of the second generation is thus not the correct portrayal of European 
energy regulation either. 
In sum, the EMR appears to have contact with different organizations at different times, 
activated by various factors or depending on upon tasks or agenda. They take active part in 
work groups and task forces of NordREG and CEER, and have contact with the OED upon 
request. Through the networks, the EMR might also have indirect contact with the EU level 
organizations. The project thus follows in line with previous case studies of similar 
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characteristics. Which have confirmed that there to varying degrees exists close and direct 
links between the domestic agencies and the other actors, often through sector-specific, 
transnational network structures (Egeberg & Trondal, 2014). Following in line with research 
from the third generation of studies on executive orders. 
One might consider whether the agency is under some sort of cross-pressure, and 
experiencing steering dialogue from multiple venues. Based on the findings, it however seems 
as NVE actively works in connection with multiple actors for the purpose of harmonizing and 
streamlining the European power and energy market. Not necessarily being subject to steering 
monologues from multiple organizations situated at exceeding levels of governance, but 
rather an active component in a compound, multilevel administrative model, most often 
through the transnational networks. Overall, NVE appears as a largely specialized, 
professional and relatively autonomous agency. 
6.2 Organizational Theoretical Explanations 
The second prospect has been to analyse how certain organizational characteristics might 
affect the degree to which NVE connect to different other organizations, or to examine 
whether the structural features explain patterns of connection. Five organizational variables 
were used, for the purpose of investigating whether they might elucidate aspects of the 
descriptive connections from the figure above. As such, organizational elements might be 
used as tools for explaining why connections occur, and what might cause potential variations 
in degrees of connection. 
The results demonstrate a perception of NVE as both vertically and horizontally specialized, 
paving the way for agency participation in transnational networks. No ministerial duplication 
is reported, and low degree of politicization, which according to theory should provide a 
foundation for little contact between NVE and the OED. Contact with the ministry department 
does however appear active, despite the structurally indicated. This is further reckoned to be 
one factor limiting the low report of direct contact with supranational organizations, in 
addition to how membership in ACER is on hold based on the stagnated inclusion of the third 
regulatory package. Further, the reported limited contact with the supranational organizations 
collides with the expected, despite a high level of supranational capacity and the lacking 
ministerial duplication and politicization. In sum, the results confirm the expected findings of 
only two of the organizational variables. 
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6.3 Future Research 
Four apparent lines ahead as potential focus for future research might be drawn from the 
research, results and conclusions of this project. First, there is an evident possibility of 
examining the connections between the remaining organizations in the model for a 
comprehensive understanding of multilevel European energy regulation. Secondly, as there is 
already conducted a range of similar case studies on other agencies and sector, conducting an 
implicit comparative research with this case and other case studies of the various Norwegian 
agencies would be a possibility. By comparing the results from the different cases, one 
enables a possibility to find unique characteristics of the different cases, but also to contribute 
to increasing general knowledge about the topics or theory (Ringdal, 2007). Third, it could be 
interesting to dig deeper into the apparently active relationship between NVE and the OED. In 
the interviews, no experienced duplication was reported. Three interviews with employees of 
one section are nonetheless too scarce information to discard the possibility entirely. 
According to Egeberg and Trondal (2015), post-NPM reforms have taken sight on stronger 
national coordination. For instance through connecting semi-autonomous agencies to national 
centres of control again. Thus, analysing whether any post-NPM reforms have been 
implemented in the energy sector would be an interesting starting point for the dissection of 
the NVE-OED connection, and potentially go further into whether an actual organizational 
duplication in fact exists. Or whether there are other explanations behind this seemingly 
active ministerial connection. 
The last, and perhaps most interesting topic to pursue further, is connected to the continuous 
topic of the third energy package. As already discussed, NVE’s autonomy is likely to increase 
after the potential inclusion of the package regulations. It is however futile to make 
assumptions about events that are yet to come. Tracing the agency’s autonomy through the 
incorporation of the third package would however be an interesting task for future research. 
Ruffing (2015) examined the effects of ACER membership on the German Federal Network 
Agency31, which proved that the agency increased its de facto autonomy at the expense of 
national control, by an increasing information asymmetry between the agency and the 
ministry. Thus, the ministry does not necessarily change its actual steering behaviour, but 
                                                
31 The Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway, 
German Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) is the German national energy regulator (CEER, s.a.-
a), and is responsible for the power market and energy resources in Germany similarly to 
NVE’s role in Norway. See www.bundesnetzagentur.de for more information. 
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national agencies seem to gain new roles and channels of influence, making the old steering 
routines insufficient, and ultimately granting the agencies more autonomy (Ruffing, 2015). 
Thus mapping NVE’s autonomy through the project of the third package emerges as a 
potential future research focus. Also, looking into the current stagnation of the third package 
would be highly interesting. Is it so that the ministry and governments are aware of the 
possible increasing autonomy and consequences for coordination? Consequently not willing 
to loosen national control? These questions sadly go beyond the breadth of this research, but 
are interesting puzzles for the mind, and potential topics for further research. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
Despite some obvious limitations of this project, some interesting findings on the field have 
been elucidated, most of which follows in line with the theoretically expected. NVE 
participates in energy regulatory MLA through active, direct contact with the OED, but also 
to the sister-regulators mainly through the transnational networks. Less contact with ACER is 
reported, and no direct contact with the supranational organizations. Not to say that this does 
not exist, however mainly that results for such contact have been absent in the findings. Thus, 
NVE is likely to be at least “double-hatted” when working on European energy regulation. 
Explaining structures of contact from an organizational perspective might not be as relevant 
as initially expected, since the expected behaviour of only two variables have been validated. 
Nevertheless, NVE is both vertically and horizontally specialized, which seems to have had a 
significant effect on the agency’s behaviour. Potential consequences ahead are many, 
especially essential appears the third energy package that is likely to change circumstances for 
harmonization, national steering, agency autonomy, and political accountability. Nonetheless, 
the energy sector is currently subject to rapid change, and it is a sector that will become 
increasingly interesting to follow over the course of time ahead. 
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8 Appendixes 
A. Information Document 
Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjektet 
”NVEs deltakelse i europeiske flernivå-samarbeid” 
Bakgrunn og formål 
Studien er en undersøkelse av norske direktoraters deltakelse i europeiske 
samarbeidsstrukturer, hvor NVE er valgt ut som case-objekt. Prosjektet er en masterstudie ved 
instituttet for statsvitenskap og ledelsesfag ved Universitetet i Agder, og gjennomføres med 
en løs tilknytning til Agder Energi som ekstern arbeidsgiver. 
NVE fremstår som et særdeles interessant objekt for en slik casestudie. Gjennom deltakelse 
på Agder Energi-konferansen 2015, og samtaler med informanter i NVE, har jeg fattet en 
interesse for hvordan endringer som nåværende gjør seg gjeldende i energisektoren påvirker 
norske aktører. Og spesielt hvordan europeiske samarbeid fungerer med bakgrunn i dette. 
Derfor ønsker jeg å komme i kontakt med de deler av NVE som er mest berørt og aktive i 
europeiske samarbeid. 
Oppgaven skrives på engelsk, men den norske problemstillingen vil være noe som følgende: 
Hvordan, og i hvilken grad inngår NVE i en sammenvevd europeisk flernivåadministrasjon 
for regulering av energi og kraftvirksomhet? Videre; ved grad av deltakelse, hvordan kan slik 
nettverksatferd forklares? Denne problemstillingen danner grunnlaget for å undersøke NVEs 
vertikale tilknytninger til OED, og til Kommisjonen, DG Energy og ACER på EU-nivå, i 
tillegg til horisontal tilknytning til NordREG og CEER. 
Etter fullføring vil denne studien føye seg inn i rekken av undersøkelser som allerede er 
gjennomført med en rekke andre norske direktorater og tilsyn, for å øke kunnskapen om 
hvordan og hvorfor norske aktører deltar i europeiske samarbeid. 
 
Hva innebærer deltakelse i studien? 
I studien er jeg interessert i informasjon om hvordan ansatte i NVE faktisk opplever kontakten 
mellom NVE og de overnevnte aktører, informasjon som er vanskelig å få tak i uten samtaler 
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med de involverte. Deltakelse i studien innebærer dermed en datainnsamling gjennom 
intervju. Disse kan gjennomføres over telefon eller mail, men aller helst ansikt-til-ansikt. 
Spørsmålene vil omhandle hvordan ansatte på ulike nivå i NVE oppfatter kontakt med andre 
europeiske aktører innen energiregulering, og hvordan NVE arbeider i forhold til reguleringer 
og direktiver som kommer fra EU. 
Datamaterialet vil helst registreres gjennom notater og lydopptak, dersom det godkjennes av 
hver enkelt deltaker. 
Hva skjer med informasjonen som blir samlet inn?  
Alle personopplysninger vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Datamaterialet vil kun være 
tilgjengelig for student og veileder. Ingen personopplysninger vil lagres sammen med 
datamaterialet for å bevare konfidensialitet. 
Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 01.06.2016. Etter fullføring av prosjektet vil alt 
datamateriell og opplysninger bli destruert, senest i løpet av juli 2016. 
Frivillig deltakelse 
Det er frivillig å delta i studien, og alle kan når som helst trekke sitt samtykke uten å oppgi 
noen grunn. 
 
Informasjonsskrivet er laget med utgangspunkt i Veiledende mal for informasjonsskriv fra NSD. 
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B. Interview Guide 
Åpningsspørsmål 
- Før vi begynner, kan du fortelle hvilket stillingsnivå du jobber på, i hvilken seksjon, 
og skissere litt hva dine vanlige arbeidsoppgaver går ut på? 
I NVE som helhet, hvor mye kontakt har dere på tvers av avdelinger og seksjoner? 
Hvilke institusjoner vil du kategorisere som NVEs samarbeidspartnere/kontakter når det 
gjelder arbeid med regulering/regelverksutvikling? 
- Er noen av disse viktigere enn andre? 
- Hvilke koblinger har NVE til disse aktørene? 
I hvilken utstrekning vil du si at NVE har kontakt med OED? 
- I hvilke situasjoner forekommer kontakten? 
- Hvem er bindeleddet? 
- Hva med Elmarkedstilsynet eller din seksjon spesielt? 
o Hvor mye kontakt har dere med OED? 
o Er det noen spesielle kontaktpersoner? 
§ Hvilket stillingsnivå er de ansatt på? 
Opplever du at det forekommer overlapping mellom NVEs/Elmarkedstilsynets 
ansvarsområder og ansvarsområdene til OED? 
- Hva med til andre aktører? 
I hvilken utstrekning vil du si at NVE har kontakt med institusjoner i EU? 
- (Kommisjonen, DG Energy, ACER?) 
I hvilken utstrekning har dere kontakt med direktorater i andre land når dere jobber med 
iverksetting eller praktisering av regelverk/reguleringer? 
- Hvordan forekommer denne kontakten? (Gjennom nettverk?) 
o Hvilke nettverk? 
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o Hvilke land? (Hovedsakelig nordiske eller også resten av Europa?) 
- Hva består denne kontakten av? / Hva kjennetegner disse nettverkene? 
o Forekommer det en arbeidsdeling mellom byråer innad i nettverket? 
Hvordan vil du beskrive de arbeidsoppgavene dere har innad i seksjonen?  
- Er de tekniske? 
Hvordan jobber dere med iverksetting av EU-reguleringer/regelverk? 
- Har dere kontakt med deres samarbeidspartnere når dere jobber med 
implementering/praktisering av regelverk? 
o Hvem? (OED, ACER, CEER, NordREG, andre?) 
- Opplever du at EU ønsker noen form for kontroll over hvordan europeisk regelverk 
blir praktisert? 
- Dersom dere er usikre på hvordan noe regelverk skal brukes, hvem kontakter dere da? 
- (Ved flere kontakter: opplever du at det forekommer noen form for krysspress for 
hvordan dere skal arbeide med regulering?) 
- Har du noen gang opplevd at deres arbeid med regulering har bragt frem uenighet, 
eller fått stor oppmerksomhet i nyhetsbildet eller lignende? At det har vakt 
kontrovers? 
Hvordan påvirkes deres arbeid med regulering av EØS-avtalen eller EU-regelverk? 
- Er det spesielle arbeidsoppgaver/hendelser som påvirkes særlig? 
Hvis vi tenker oss en situasjon hvor det arbeides med utforming av regelverk/reguleringer i 
EU, som vil påvirke eller være relevant for NVE, hvordan arbeider dere for å ta del i 
utformingen av disse? 
- Søker dere støtte for deres synspunkter hos lignende direktorat eller tilsyn i andre 
land? Hovedsakelig nordisk eller også andre europeiske land? 
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C. Organizational Chart NVE 
 
Accessed 25.04.2016 from https://www.nve.no/Media/3400/orgkart-ul-eng-11012016.pdf 
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D. Organizational Chart OED 
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E. Regulation Procedure 
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F. Organizational Chart ACER 
 
Accessed 25.04.2016 from 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Organisation/Documents/Organisational%20Chart
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G. Organizational Chart CEER 
 
Accessed 25.04.2016 from 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ABOUT/ORGANISATION 
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